United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. BURKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 12, 2017, plaintiff David Ray Jackson filed a
complaint (Doc. 1) seeking judicial review of an adverse
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“the Commissioner”) pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On March 8, 2018, plaintiff filed a
memorandum (Doc. 10). On April 6, 2018, the Commissioner
filed a memorandum (Doc. 11). Therefore, this matter is ripe
for review. For the reasons stated below, the final decision
of the Commissioner is affirmed.
December 19, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits;
plaintiff also filed an application for supplemental social
security income on the same day. (Tr. 19). In both
applications, plaintiff alleged disability beginning on
February 1, 2013. (Id.). On October 21, 2015, the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), Walter V.
Lassiter, Jr., conducted a video hearing from Franklin,
Tennessee. (Id. at 75). Plaintiff, his attorney, and
a vocational expert (“VE”) were present at the
hearing. (Id.). On February 25, 2016, the ALJ issued
his decision. In doing so, the ALJ engaged in the five-step
sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commission
to determine whether an individual is disabled. (Id.
at 19-28). The ALJ made the following findings:
1. Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through December 31, 2015. (Id.
2. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since February 1, 2013, the alleged onset date.
3. Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: coronary
artery disease, diabetes mellitus, and status-port
arthroscopy of the left knee with a partial medial
4. Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 22).
5. Plaintiff has the residual functioning capacity
(“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that he
can stand and/or walk at least two hours without interruption
and a total of at least six hours over the course of an
eight-hour workday; can sit at least six hours over the
course of an eight-hour work day; cannot climb ropes, poles,
or scaffolds; can occasionally climb ladders, ramps, and
stairs; can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch and
occasionally crawl; can frequently work in humidity, wetness,
and extreme temperatures; can frequently work in dusts,
gases, odors, and fumes; cannot work in poorly ventilated
areas; cannot work at unprotected heights; can frequently
work with operating hazardous machinery and is not limited
with operating motorized vehicles. (Id. at 23-24).
6. Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as
an outside sales representative and a small business owner.
This work does not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by plaintiff's RFC. (Id. at
7. Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, from February 1, 2013, through the
date of his decision on February 25, 2016. (Id. at
requested an appeal to the Appeals Council, which denied his
request for review on August 30, 2017. (Tr. 1). At that
point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner. Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff then filed
this action on October 9, 2017. (Doc. 1).