United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ANITRA DIAMOND and LEBARRON YATES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
KIMBERLY HASTIE, in her individual capacity, Defendant.
ORDER
KRISTI
K. DUBOSE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on "Plaintiffs' Motion
and Incorporated Memorandum in Support of Class
Certification" (Docs. 78, 79) and Defendant's
opposition (Doc. 83).
On
April 14, 2015, Plaintiffs -- individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated - - filed a class action
complaint alleging that Defendant unlawfully accessed,
obtained, used and/or disclosed their personal information
(motor vehicle records) in violation of both the
Drivers' Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2721, et. seq. (DPPA) (Count I) and
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II). (Doc. 1, Doc. 36 (as
amended)). Specifically, as alleged:
During August 2013, Defendant Hastie…knowingly
authorized, directed, ratified, approved, acquiesced in,
committed, or participated in, acts and practices in direct
violation of the DPPA when she ordered an employee of the
Mobile County License Commission to access Plaintiffs'
and the Class Members' Personal Information contained in
motor vehicle records. Hastie ordered the employee to access
motor vehicle records and gather the email addresses of all
Mobile County residents who reside within the city limits and
place that Personal Information onto an electronic storage
device (a “thumb drive”). Hastie then ordered
that the Personal Information be provided to the campaign of
a local political candidate…[which]….knowingly
received the Personal Information and utilized it in order
promote a local political candidate….
(Id.)[1]
On
November 12, 2018, Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of
similar situated individuals, asserting that certification is
proper because the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied.
(Doc. 78). As grounds, Plaintiffs contend that certification
under Rule 23(a) is proper because: 1) the class of over 30,
000 plaintiffs is sufficiently numerous to render joinder
impracticable; 2) defendant Hastie obtained, used, and/or
disclosed DPPA protected personal information of each class
member in an identical manner and therefore there are
numerous issues of law and facts common to each class member:
3) the claims of the class representatives are typical of, if
not identical to, the claims of the class as a whole; and 4)
the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. (Id.) Plaintiffs add
that certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is proper because:
"Hastie obtained, used, and/or disclosed the DPPA
protected personal information of each class member in
identical fashion; therefore, common questions of law and
fact predominate over individual questions. Moreover, given
the size of the proposed class, the utilization of the class
action device is superior to other available methods of
litigation and, as such, represents the most fair and
efficient mode of adjudicating this controversy." On
December 20, 2018, Defendant filed her opposition, asserting,
in part, that: 1) the proposed class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impractical; 2) questions of law
and fact are not common to class members; 3) the named
plaintiffs are not typical of claims of the proposed class;
and 4) Plaintiffs assert a Section 1983 claim as to which
there is no statutory liquidated damages amount and class
certification is not superior. (Doc. 83).
Rule
23(a) addresses prerequisites, stating that:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a). “For a district court to certify
a class action, the named plaintiffs must have standing, and
the putative class must meet each of the requirements
specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), as well
as at least one of the requirements set forth in Rule
23(b).” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d
1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted). Thus, Rule 23(a) requires a putative class to meet
four requirements: 1) numerosity; 2) commonality; 3)
typicality; and 4) adequacy of representation. Id.
After satisfying Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites, a plaintiff
must also show the case can proceed as a class under Rule
23(b).
Plaintiffs
seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3)
addresses types ...