United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRAY
M. BORDEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Now
before the court is a Motion to Remand filed by the
Plaintiff, Michelle Lockhart. Doc. 6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, the
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate Judge. Docs. 10, 11 & 12. After careful
consideration of the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, for reasons to be discussed, the Motion to
Remand is due to be DENIED.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lockhart
is a black woman who brings claims against her former
employer, Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc. d/b/a/
Fresenius Medical Care Capitol City and Fresenius Medical
Care Holdings, Inc. d/b/a/ Fresenius Medical Care North
America (collectively, “Fresenius”). Lockhart
began her employment as a dialysis technician and was
employed in various capacities from October 2002 until her
termination in 2017. At the time of her termination, Lockhart
was a Biomedical Technician I. Lockhart alleges in her
complaint that she was not offered training that was made
available to a white male employee for the Biomedical
Technician I position and, as a result, an audit revealed
high results on cultures and she was terminated. She also
alleges that a white male employee who failed to draw
cultures was not punished or terminated.
On
September 18, 2018, Lockhart filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County, Alabama bringing claims for race
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, gender
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq. (“Title VII”), interference with job,
and negligent hiring, training and supervision. Doc. 1-2.
On
November 7, 2018, the defendants removed the case to this
court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Doc. 1.
Lockhart does not dispute that the removal was timely. Doc.
14 at 2.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994);
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095
(1994); Wymbs v. Repub. St. Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d
1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983). As such, federal courts only
have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized
to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United
States. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Because
federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit
favors remand of removed cases where federal jurisdiction is
not absolutely clear. See Burns, 31 F.3d at
III.
DISCUSSION
In the
Motion to Remand, Lockhart challenges Fresenius' removal
on the ground that her case may be heard in state court
because this court and the state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over her federal claims. Lockhart is correct in
pointing out that this court's jurisdiction over her
Title VII claim is concurrent, and not exclusive. See
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823
(1990). However, concurrent jurisdiction does not deprive
Fresenius of the right to remove the case to federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (“Except as
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district
court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.”)
In
Chilton v. Savannah Foods and Industries,
Incorporated, 814 F.2d 620, 622-23 (11th Cir. 1987), the
Eleventh Circuit held that the removal of a case to federal
court is proper when the federal court has concurrent
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim. The court
explained that an argument that such a removal is not
appropriate would “disallow removal of cases over which
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction by
equating ‘original jurisdiction' with
‘exclusive jurisdiction.'” Id.
Moreover, equating original and exclusive jurisdiction would
make 28 U.S.C. § 1441 meaningless. Id.; see
also Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259,
1264 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e have held that where
Congress has granted concurrent jurisdiction to state and
federal courts, removal is not barred.”). The legal
principle that federal claims over which state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction still may be removed to federal court
is regularly applied by federal district courts. See,
e.g., Pierre v. Miami-Dade Cty., 2006 WL
8433535, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2006) (“Merely
because a state court may hear a case involving a federal
claim does not mean that a defendant is divested of his right
to remove that case to federal court”); Mathews v.
Anderson, 826 F.Supp. 479, 480 n.1 (M.D. Ga. 1993)
(stating that “concurrent jurisdiction does not destroy
a defendant's right to remove a case that could have been
filed in federal court”). Furthermore, the instant case
does not present a situation in which Congress has
“expressly provided” against removal. See
Spencer v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 657 F.Supp. 66, 67
(S.D. Fla. 1986). To the contrary, Title VII cases are
routinely removed. Nor is this a case in which the facts
would support a Title VII claim but the plaintiff has relied
only on state-law theories of recovery. See, e.g.,
Mathews, 826 F.Supp. at 482. Instead, Lockhart
explicitly pleaded a Title VII claim, as well as a §
1981 claim, over which this court has original subject matter
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1331. The court also may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1367. Therefore, this court has subject matter
jurisdiction and the timely removal to federal court in this
case is consistent with the removal statute. 28 U.S.C. §
1441.
IV.
...