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Jarrell v. Valenza

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division

August 17, 2018

SHERIFF DONALD VALENZA, et al., Defendants.



         I. INTRODUCTION[1]

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by George Edward Jarrell (“Jarrell”), a pre-trial detainee confined in the Houston County Jail at the time he initiated this case, challenging the adequacy of medical treatment provided to him for injuries sustained during his arrest on September 20, 2014 immediately prior to his confinement in the jail. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Jarrell names Donald Valenza, the Sheriff of Houston County, Alabama, and Jason Smoak, a Certified Physician's Assistant employed at the jail, as defendants.[2] He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

         The defendants filed an answer, special report and supporting evidentiary materials - including affidavits and certified medical records - addressing Jarrell's inadequate medical treatment claim. In these documents, the defendants assert Jarrell received appropriate treatment for his injuries as determined by the jails medical professionals and they adamantly deny acting with deliberate indifference to Jarrell's medical needs.

         The court issued an order directing Jarrell to file a response to the arguments set forth by the defendants in their special report and advising him that his response should be supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other appropriate evidentiary materials. Doc. 17 at 3. The order specifically advised the parties that “at some time in the future the court may treat the defendants' report . . . [as] either a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment[.]” Doc. 17 at 3. In addition, the order specifically cautioned the parties that “unless within ten (10) days from the date of this order a party files a response in opposition which presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to the order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a [dispositive] motion, and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion in accordance with the law.” Doc. 17 at 4 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Jarrell filed a sworn response to this order on June 28, 2016 in which he challenges the treatment decisions made by defendant Smoak. Doc. 18.

         Pursuant to the directives of the orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff's response in opposition, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.


         “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ. P. (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).[3] The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Williamson Oil Company, Inc. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that moving party bears the initial burden of establishing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. The moving party discharges his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011).

         When the defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have in this case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it.”). Once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ” demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts “must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted).

         To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff may not rest upon his pleadings but must produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting each essential element of his claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). Conclusory allegations based on a plaintiff's subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment.”); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. - and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).

         For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.” Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question.” Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Anderson, supra).

         To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. A court may grant summary judgment where the pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact. Id. To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

         Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Jarrell's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.

         The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After such review, the court finds that Jarrell has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.


         Jarrell asserts defendant Smoak denied him adequate medical treatment for neck, head, back and shoulder pain emanating from injuries suffered immediately prior to his incarceration in the Houston County Jail. Jarrell also appears to argue that Sheriff Valenza acted with deliberate indifference because Valenza failed to intervene regarding the course of treatment provided by Smoak. As discussed in detail below, Jarrell fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

         A. Applicable Legal Standard

         The actions about which Jarrell complains occurred from September of 2014 until the filing of this complaint in March of 2016. It is undisputed that Jarrell was a pretrial detainee at the time relevant to the complaint. Jarrell's claims are therefore subject to review under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits the imposition of punishment on those who have not yet been convicted of a crime, rather than the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment which governs claims of convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners.”). “[I]n regard to providing pretrial detainees with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the minimum standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the eighth amendment for convicted persons.” Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986). As to these claims, the Eleventh Circuit has long held that “the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.” Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490; Hamm, 774 F.2d 1574 (holding that for analytical purposes, there is no meaningful difference between the analysis required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth Amendment.); Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (observing that “[w]hether the alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”).

In a recent decision addressing a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim, the United States Supreme Court held that under the Fourteenth Amendment the detainee “must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.... A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable [official] on the scene, including what that [official] knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). The court in Kinglesy reaffirmed that a defendant “must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a [criminally] reckless state of mind. That is because ... ‘liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.' Id. at 2472 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)). The Court further emphasized that the ‘guarantee of due process has [historically] been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty or property.'” Id.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether to extend the objective reasonableness standard of review set forth in Kingsley to cases of pretrial detainees which do not involve the use of excessive force (i.e., cases challenging medical treatment or conditions of confinement). However, an extensive search of post-Kingsley cases indicates that the vast majority of federal courts, including [this court and] the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have continued to utilize the deliberate indifference standard in deciding claims of pretrial detainees which challenge medical treatment and other conditions. E.g., Massey v. Quality Correctional Health Care, Inc., et al., 2015 WL 852054 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 26, 2015), affirmed on appeal, [Massey v. Montgomery County Detention Facility, 646 Fed.Appx. 777] (11th 2016) (addressing claims of a pretrial detainee challenging the medical treatment provided to him while in a county jail, without reference to Kingsley, and applying the deliberate indifference standard to find that the defendants' actions did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference); McBride v. Houston County Health Auth., 2015 WL 3892715, *10 & 15-20 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2015) (recognizing the impact of Kingsley on excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees but subsequently applying the deliberate indifference standard to the plaintiff pretrial detainee's medical treatment claim) [affirmed 658 Fed.Appx. 991 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that district court properly applied the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment in denying summary judgment to defendant on pretrial detainee's challenge to constitutionality of medical treatment provided for skin condition)]; White v. Franklin, 2016 WL 749063, at *5-8 (N. D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 741962 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2016) (applying Kingsley's objective reasonableness standard to pretrial detainee's claim of excessive force but addressing his claims of inadequate medical treatment under the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment in accordance with prior Eleventh Circuit precedent); Woodhouse v. City of Mount Vernon, et al., 2016 WL 354896, at *10 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2016) (applying “a subjective standard to [detainee's] Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, just as it would to an Eighth Amendment claim brought by a convicted prisoner, ” despite Kingsley); Thomley v. Bennett, et al., 2016 WL 498436, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 3454383 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2016) (finding Kingsley does not “provide[] the standard to be applied” to pretrial detainee's medical treatment claims).
As indicated above, the Eleventh Circuit recently applied the deliberate indifference standard to a pretrial detainee's claims challenging the constitutionality of medical treatment provided to him by health care personnel at a county jail. See Massey, [646 Fed.Appx. at 781]. In affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants, the Court held:
There is ... no basis for [Plaintiff's] claim that [the defendant physicians'] diagnosis and treatment of his ailments rose to the level of deliberate indifference. There is a difference between “mere incidents of negligence or malpractice” and deliberate indifference. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.1991). The former, “while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). The latter, by contrast, is a violation of the Eighth Amendment, but requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew of a serious risk to the plaintiff and affirmatively disregarded it. See McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.1999). There is no genuine dispute that [the jail physicians] actively attempted to diagnose and treat [Plaintiff]. The treatment they offered may not have been as effective or instantaneous as [Plaintiff] would have liked, but the bare fact that treatment was ineffectual or not immediately administered does not mean that those responsible for it were deliberately indifferent. Because the record does not establish a genuine dispute that [the attending physicians] made a good-faith effort to treat [Plaintiff's] ailments, summary judgment was appropriate.
Id. The Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits are in accord. See Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2015); Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 2015); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2015).

Smith v. Terry, 2016 WL 4942066 at *3 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 15, 2016), Recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4923506 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2016); Nam Dang by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that a pre-trial detainee's “claims are evaluated under the same [deliberate indifference] standard as a prisoner's claim of inadequate care under the Eighth Amendment” and specifically refusing to extend the objective reasonableness standard set forth in Kingsley to such claims).

         Other district courts post-Kingsley have also applied the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment in deciding medical claims presented by pretrial detainees. Oliver v. County of Gregory, 2016 WL 958171, at *6 n.11 (D. So. Dakota Mar. 8, 2016) (noting that the holding in Kingsley “was limited to excessive force cases under the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Thus, the Eighth Circuit still utilizes the subjective measure of deliberate indifference ... for pretrial detainees in Fourteenth Amendment cases involving an allegation of deprivation of medical care.”); Hall v. Ramsey County, 801 F.3d 912, 917 n.3 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting Kingsley's holding in discussion of pretrial detainee's excessive force claim and then applying subjective prong of deliberate indifference to his deprivation of medical care claim.); Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, et al., 2016 WL 345514, *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 1, 2016) (acknowledging Kingsley but finding that “[t]he relevant state of mind for a condition[s] claim [i.e., deprivations of food, medical care, sanitation or other objectionable conditions, ] is deliberate indifference.”); Figueira by and through Jarrell v. County of Sutter, 2015 WL 6449151 (E.D Calif. Oct. 23, 2015) (holding that despite Kingsley pretrial detainee “must show the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs[]” as required by prior Ninth Circuit law applying same legal standard to Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments claims challenging conditions claims, including those alleging a denial of adequate medical treatment); Gilbert v. Rohana, 14 Civ. 630, 2015 WL 6442289, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2015) (“The court finds that Kingsley did not alter the legal standard for denial of medical treatment claims brought by pretrial detainees like Plaintiff. Kingsley was limited to excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees; the Court did not comment on the appropriate standard for denial of medical treatment claims brought by such detainees.”); Larson v. Stacy, 2015 WL 5315500, at *6-9 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2015), Recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 7753346 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2015) (court utilized objective reasonableness standard to address pretrial detainee's excessive force claims but applied deliberate indifference standard to his medical care claims); Johnson v. Hodgson, 2015 WL 5609960, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2015) (court acknowledged application of Kingsley to pretrial detainee's excessive force claim but stated deliberate indifference standard was proper standard for review of his inadequate medical treatment claims); Landy v. Isenberg, 2015 WL 5289027, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 9, 2015) (same); Wells v. T.C.C.F., 2015 WL 4875872, at *2 (N.D. Miss Aug. 15, 2015) (recognizing that under Kingsley “[m]ere negligence . . . will not support the finding of a constitutional violation” on a pretrial detainee's challenge to medical care and then holding that to proceed on such a claim “a detainee must demonstrate” each of the elements of deliberate indifference); Roberts v. C-73 Medical Director, 2015 WL 4253796, at *3 (S.D. N.Y.July 13, 2015) (“The decision in Kingsley dealt only with excessive force claims, thus [this] Court continues to abide by Second Circuit precedent setting forth a subjective standard for cases involving allegations of deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee's serious medical needs.”); Kennedy v. Bd. of Commissioners for Oklahoma County, 2015 WL 4078177, at *1 n.6 (W.D. Okla. July 6, 2015) (holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley “does not alter the [deliberate indifference] standard applicable to medical care claims” of pretrial detainees.); Austin v. County of Alameda, 2015 WL 4051997 at *3 (N.D. Cal July 2, 2015) (same).

         Based on the foregoing authorities, the court deems it appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference standard to Jarrell's claim of inadequate medical treatment, instead of the objective reasonableness standard applied to the excessive force claim before the Court in Kingsley.[1]

         B. Deliberate Indifference

         To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate medical treatment, an inmate must show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir.1986). Specifically, jail and medical personnel may not subject an inmate to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (As directed by Estelle, a plaintiff must establish “not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary] treatment.”

That medical malpractice-negligence by a physician-is insufficient to form the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well settled. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-07, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). Instead, something more must be shown. Evidence must support a conclusion that a prison physician's harmful acts were intentional or reckless. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977-79, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that deliberate indifference is equivalent of recklessly disregarding substantial risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1543 (stating that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to assert an Eighth Amendment violation); Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1191 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Supreme Court has defined “deliberate indifference” as requiring more than mere negligence and has adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from criminal law); Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating “deliberate indifference” is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless” conduct describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).

         In order to set forth a cognizable claim of “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . ., Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (holding that for liability to attach, defendant must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to prisoner's health or safety). Regarding the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show “an objectively ‘serious medical need[]' . . . and second, that the response made by [the defendants] to that need was poor enough to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' and not merely accidental inadequacy, ‘negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or treat[ment],' or even ‘[m]edical malpractice' actionable under state law.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations omitted).[2] This is likewise true for a claim reviewed under the objective reasonableness standard. Thus, to proceed on a claim challenging the constitutionality of medical care under either standard of review, “[t]he facts alleged must do more than contend medical malpractice, misdiagnosis, accidents, [or] poor exercise of medical judgment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-97, 97 S.Ct. 285. An allegation of negligence is insufficient to state a due process claim. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-33, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).” Simpson v. Holder, 200 Fed.Appx. 836, 839 (11th Cir. 2006); Green v. Watson, 2015 WL 4609977, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 2015) (Due to “the state of mind requirement for all due process violations[, ] . . . medical malpractice and negligence claims are not actionable under § 1983, but are the grist of state law.); Kingsley, __U.S. at__, 135 S.Ct. 2472 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1999)) (With respect to the “legally requisite state of mind” attendant to a defendant's physical acts in determining the objective reasonableness of such acts, “the defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a [criminally] reckless state of mind. That is because . . . ‘liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.'”); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (neither negligence nor medical malpractice “become[s] a constitutional violation simply because the victim is incarcerated.”); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 (A complaint alleging negligence in diagnosing or treating “a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment[, ]” nor does it establish the requisite reckless disregard of a substantial risk of harm so as to demonstrate a constitutional violation.); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332 (The Constitution “does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries. . . . We have previously rejected reasoning that would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.”) (internal quotations omitted); Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Mere negligence . . . is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference.”); Matthews v. Palte, 282 Fed.Appx. 770, 771 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court's summary dismissal of inmate complaint alleging “misdiagnosis and inadequate treatment [as such] involve no more than medical negligence.”); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must show more than negligence or the misdiagnosis of an ailment.”); Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that negligence in misdiagnosis of pituitary tumor not sufficient to show deliberate indifference); Barr v. Fla. Dept. of Corr., 2011 WL 1365552, at *4 (S.D. Fla. April 11, 2011) (finding that plaintiff due no relief where misdiagnosis, which led to improper insertion of feeding tube, did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference as misdiagnosis amounted to nothing more than negligence); Null v. Mangual, 2012 WL 3764865, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2012) (finding that misdiagnosis of inmate with Ganglion cyst that “was eventually diagnosed as synovial sarcoma, a form of skin cancer [leading to a later discovery of] multiple spots of cancer on his lungs . . . fail[ed] to show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference as opposed to mere negligence. . . . At most, [Defendants] misdiagnosed Plaintiff's growth, which amounts to a claim of negligence or medical malpractice.”); Payne v. Groh, 1999 WL 33320439, at *5 (W.D. N.C. July 16, 1999) (citing Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1986)) (“An allegation of misdiagnosis, even when accompanied by a speculative allegation of subjective intent, amounts only to the state-law tort of medical malpractice, not to a tort of constitutional magnitude for which Section 1983 is reserved. Conclusory allegations sounding in malpractice or negligence do not state a federal constitutional claim.”). In addition, Kingsley's requirement of a purposeful or knowing state of mind, its assertion that due process protects only against deliberate acts and its affirmation that negligence categorically fails to provide a basis for liability in section 1983 actions, ___U.S. at___, 135 S.Ct. at 2472, serves to preclude the constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims such as those which allege misdiagnosis or negligent treatment of a condition. Consequently, merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis, negligence in treatment and medical malpractice do not suffice to establish the objective component of claims seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations regarding medical treatment provided to an inmate, whether he is a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner.

         Furthermore, “to show the required subjective intent . . ., a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of deliberate indifference . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate things awareness of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 (holding that defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Additionally, “an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

In articulating the scope of inmates' right to be free from deliberate indifference, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . emphasized that not ‘every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.' Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth amendment only when it is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.' Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292 (‘Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.'); Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not sufficient' to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor does a simple ...

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