Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Few v. Receivables Performance Managment

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

August 9, 2018

TINA FEW, Plaintiff,
v.
RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          KARON OWEN BOWDRE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Tina Few asserts that Defendant Receivables Performance Management violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, by contacting her at least 184 times using an automated dialing machine in an attempt to collect a debt for satellite television and internet services. This matter is before the court on Receivables's amended motion for summary judgment (doc. 14).

         Receivables moves for summary judgment arguing, in part, that Ms. Few's claim must fail because she consented to receiving the debt-collection calls on her cell phone. Ms. Few responds that she revoked her consent before receiving many of the calls. Receivables, however, replies that Ms. Few offered her consent as part of a contractual agreement.

         The court agrees with Receivables's position; Ms. Few could not unilaterally revoke her consent to receive debt-collection calls because she agreed to provide that consent as part of a bargained-for exchange. The court will GRANT Receivables's amended motion for summary judgment (doc. 14).

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment allows a trial court to decide cases when no genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When a district court reviews a motion for summary judgment, it must determine two things: (1) whether any genuine issues of material fact exist; and if not, (2) whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

         The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). The moving party can meet this burden by offering evidence showing no dispute of material fact. Id. at 322-23.

         Once the moving party meets its burden of showing the district court that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). In reviewing the evidence submitted, the court must “view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden, ” to determine whether the nonmoving party presented sufficient evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986); Cottle v. Storer Commc'n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988). And, the court must view all evidence and inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999).

         FACTS

         Plaintiff Tina Few and DISH, a satellite communications firm, agreed to a contract to provide Ms. Few with DISH's television and high-speed internet services. As part of the contract, Ms. Few provided DISH with a telephone number ending in 0268 and authorized DISH “and/or any debt collection agency and/or debt collection attorney hired by DISH, ” to contact her at that number “to recover any unpaid portion of [her] obligation to DISH, through an automated or predictive dialing system or prerecorded messaging system[.]” (Doc. 6-3 at 9; Doc. 6-3 at 15). Ms. Few signed the document immediately above this language.

         In April 2017, DISH provided Defendant Receivables Performance Management, a debt-collections firm, with the 0268 phone number for the purpose of recovering an alleged debt on the account. On April 27, 2017, Ms. Few answered a call from Receivables and informed the caller that she no longer wished to receive calls from Receivables. Receivables nevertheless continued calling, ultimately placing, in Ms. Few's estimation, “in excess of 184 telephone calls and text messages.” (Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 12).[1]

         DISCUSSION

         Ms. Few asserts that Receivable's phone calls and text messages violated the TCPA. The TCPA forbids any person to make a call “using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). But calls made “with the prior express consent of the called party” are not prohibited. Id.

         In this case, Ms. Few contends that, although she may have initially provided DISH- and, by extension, Receivables, which acted as DISH's agent for the purpose of debt collection-with consent to call the 0268 number, she revoked that consent orally on April 27, 2017. Receivables, however, responds that Ms. Few could not unilaterally revoke her ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.