FLOR ANDREA RODRIGUEZ ASALDE, JOHN CONDE, JAVIER ANTONIO CABRERA SAVINOVICH, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiffs - Appellants,
FIRST CLASS PARKING SYSTEMS LLC, a.k.a. 1ST CLASS VALET SERVICE, SEBASTIAN LOPEZ, JORGE ZULUAGA, Defendants - Appellees.
from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-20027-MGC
JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges. 
JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE
withdraw our previous opinion, reported at 894 F.3d 1248
(11th Cir. 2018), and issue this opinion in its place.
Andrea Rodriguez Asalde and others worked as valets for First
Class Parking Systems LLC in Miami-Dade County, Florida. They
brought claims against FCPS and its owners (whom we refer to
collectively as FCPS) under the minimum-wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
201 et seq. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of FCPS, concluding that there was no
"enterprise" coverage under the FLSA.
a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral
argument, we conclude that FCPS was not entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of "enterprise" coverage.
Based on the evidence, a jury could find that the valet
tickets used by the plaintiffs in their work for FCPS
constituted "materials" under the FLSA's
"handling clause," thereby providing
"enterprise" coverage. See 29 U.S.C.
FLSA covers certain employment scenarios. See, e.g.,
29 U.S.C. § 203(s). The plaintiffs here
asserted in part that their employment by FCPS as valets was
covered by the "materials" prong of the
"handling clause" under the "enterprise"
coverage provision in the Act. See Polycarpe v. E&S
Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (11th
Cir. 2010). Cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs.,
Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006) (addressing
"individual" coverage rather than
"enterprise" coverage). The "handling
clause" provides that an entity is subject to
"enterprise" coverage under the FLSA if it
"has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working
on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for
[interstate or international] commerce by any person."
29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i). See also
§ 203(b) (defining "commerce"). The entity
must also have an "annual gross volume of sales made or
business done [of] not less than $500, 000," §
203(s)(1)(A)(ii), but that requirement is not at issue on
appeal because FCPS stipulated that it earned at least $500,
000 in the years at issue. See D.E. 44-4, Deposition
of Sebastian Lopez at 11.
moved for summary judgment, FCPS argued in part that the
plaintiffs could not show that any employees handled any
qualifying "goods or materials." The district court
agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of FCPS on this
basis alone. The court concluded that the cars parked by the
plaintiffs were not "materials" under the FLSA. It
also ruled that "the fact that [the plaintiffs] handled
walkie-talkies, pens, uniforms, valet tickets and other items
that originated out of state" did not change the
"instrastate nature of their work" because
"[FCPS] was the ultimate consumer of those goods."
Rodriguez Asalde v. First Class Parking Sys. LLC,
2016 WL 5464599, at *2-3 & n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29,
review the district court's summary judgment order de
novo, and view the evidence (and inferences) in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, who were the non-moving
parties. See Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A.,
512 U.S. 92, 94 (1994); Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d
843, 848 (11th Cir. 2010). We hold that the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs permits a jury to find that the
valet tickets they used while working for FCPS were
"materials" within the meaning of
and "materials" are distinct (i.e., not
overlapping) categories; an object may be a "good"
in certain contexts and a "material" in others.
See Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1222, 1225-27. The term
"goods" is defined broadly in the Act. See
id. at 1222 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(i)). The term
"materials" is not defined at all. See
Rodriguez v. Gold Star, Inc., 858 F.3d 1368, 1370 (11th
Cir. 2017) (decided after the district court's ruling in
this case); Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at
Polycarpe, we concluded that "materials"
are "tools or other articles necessary for doing or
making something," 616 F.3d at 1224, but added a
cautionary footnote: "We do not rule out today that
additional meanings of 'materials' might also exist
that also preserve the unchanged 'goods' definition
and the important ultimate-consumer exception. But no party
has drawn our attention to such a definition of
'materials' in this case." Id. at 1224
out the following test for determining whether an item
constitutes a ...