United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
pending before the Court is the motion filed by David Eugene
Clark (hereinafter “Movant”) seeking to vacate
the judgment of conviction against him and to dismiss all
charges against him “due to the United States'
failure to allege and proof of [sic] ‘standing'
” (Doc. 43 at 1). The motion was filed on June 6,
expressly states that ‘THIS IS NOT A SECTION 2255
‘MOTION' ”. (Id. at 1)
(capitalization in original). However, the relief he seeks is
that his sentence be vacated. (Id. at 4)
(“MOVANT, hereby requests this ‘sentencing
court', to: *** 3) Vacate MOVANT's sentences due to
the United States' failure to allege and prove
‘injury-in-fact' as required and protected, under
Article III, of the United States Constitution.”)
(capitalization and punctuation in original). Movant
challenges his sentence as having been imposed in violation
of his “Article III Constitutional Rights” which
he describes variously as [lack of] “Actual, concrete,
injury-in-fact” (id., at 1 and
passim), and [lack of] “case or
controversy” (id.). Further, he expressly
relies on 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (id. at 4)
(“Movant does hereby further rely on Congress's
intent under § 2255 which states ....”).
any collateral challenge to the validity of a federal sentence
must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In relevant
part, that statute states:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
includes challenges based on alleged “violation(s) of
the Constitution ... or that the court was without
Court has noted that this is the first § 2255 petition
filed by Mr. Clark. Accordingly, the Court provided Mr.
Clark, on June 19, 2018, written notice (Order, doc. 44) that
the Court would construe his motion as a motion to vacate
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless, no later
than July 18, 2018, he withdrew it. In response, Mr. Clark
filed an “Objection to Courts [sic] Handling”
(doc. 45). In that Objection, he maintains that his pending
motion “was in compliance with § 2255(a).”
(Id.). So, he did not withdraw or amend the motion,
nor did he argue that it should not be addressed under §
2255. He did, however, argue for the first time that
“§ 2255(f) is unconstitutional.”
reviewing Mr. Clark's response, the Court directed the
Clerk of Court to open a new case brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 and to file the Motion in it. (Order, doc. 46).
The Court now responds substantively to the motion, as
supplemented by the Objection.
out above, Mr. Clark has asserted two arguments in support of
his motion. First, in response to this Court's
Castro Notice (doc. 44), in which the Court noted
that the motion was untimely (see doc. 44 at 1, fn
1), Mr. Clark argues that the one-year statutory time
limitation found at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) is an
unconstitutional “suspension clause trigger ... denying
Habeas [sic] corpus actions.” (Doc. 45 at 2). On the
merits, he argues that his conviction is void because the
United States did not have “Article III Standing”
because it was did not allege or prove any “injury in
fact”. (See docs. 43, 45, passim).
Clark has asserted Article III to support his Constitutional
challenge to the validity of his sentence. Thus, his
motion is ...