United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
JOHN DOE #1, JOHN DOE #3, JOHN DOE #7, JOHN DOE # 9, and JOHN DOE #10, Plaintiffs,
STEVEN T. MARSHALL, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, in his official capacity; CHARLES WARD, Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, in his official capacity; and HAL TAYLOR, Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, in his official capacity, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KEITH WATKINS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
Supplement to Second Amended Complaint (see Docs. #
132 & 134-1), which has been fully briefed (Docs. # 135
& 136). The motion is due to be granted in part and
denied in part.
a case challenging the constitutionality of various
provisions of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification Act (“ASORCNA, ” or the
“Act”), Ala. Code § 15-20A-1 et
seq. A more robust recap can be found in the court's
most recent memorandum opinion and order on Defendants'
motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 125.) For now, a brief overview of
the case's procedural history will be sufficient.
filed their initial Complaint on August 20, 2015. (Doc. # 1.)
That complaint was amended with the court's permission on
November 18, 2015. (Doc. # 39.) Defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, and the court granted that
motion in part and denied it in part on March 18, 2016. (Doc.
# 51.) Then came another motion to amend the complaint
— granted by the court on August 17, 2016 (Doc. # 80)
— and another motion to dismiss (Doc. # 87). Before
that motion could be ruled on, the Alabama legislature passed
Alabama Act No. 2017-414 (the “Amendment”), which
revised many of the challenged ASORCNA provisions.
Supplemental briefing on the impact of those amendments was
then ordered (see Docs. # 110, 113, & 114), and
on March 14, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in
part the motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 125.) Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was also
denied without prejudice at that time.
all that was said and done, Plaintiffs' six counts in
their second amended complaint were reduced to four: a
challenge to ASORCNA's residency restrictions based on a
due process right to intimate association (Count I); a due
process vagueness challenge to ASORCNA's employment
exclusion zones (the surviving claim of Count III); a First
Amendment compelled-speech challenge to ASORCNA's
branded-identification requirement (Count IV); and a First
Amendment overbreadth challenge to ASORCNA's internet
reporting requirements (Count V). Dismissed without prejudice
were Plaintiffs' due process challenge based on an
irrebuttable presumption of dangerousness (Count II), their
vagueness challenge to residency exclusion zones and certain
reporting requirements (two of the three claims brought under
Count III), and their 42 U.S.C. § 1983
individual-capacity claims against the officers responsible
for the implementation of ASORCNA's
branded-identification requirement (Count VI).
now “seek to supplement their complaint to reflect the
passage and implementation of Alabama Act No.
2017-414.” (Doc. # 132, at 1.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides:
On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just
terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading
setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that
happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.
The court may permit supplementation even though the original
pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. The
court may order that the opposing party plead to the
supplemental pleading within a specified time.
generally agree that leave to file a supplemental pleading
“should be freely granted when doing so will promote
the economic and speedy disposition of the entire controversy
between the parties, will not cause undue delay or trial
inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of any of
the other parties to the action.” 6A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1504 (3d ed. 2018)
(collecting cases). This is a similar standard to that used
in determining whether to grant leave to amend pursuant to
Rule 15(a)(2), with the notable exception being that any
supplementation must be based on a “transaction,
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of
the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d)
(emphasis added). If a motion to supplement is based on
events occurring before the pleading was filed, the
court is free to construe it as a motion to amend. Aside from
that, however, most other considerations are the same:
“Would the supplementation be futile? Would a nonmovant
be prejudiced? Has there been any unreasonable delay in
presenting the supplementation? And would the supplementation
facilitate the efficient resolution of current claims as well
as any new ones?” W. Ala. Women's Ctr. v.
Miller, 318 F.R.D. 143, 148 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (citations
omitted); cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962) (listing “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, [and] futility of amendment” as factors to
consider on a motion to amend).
stated, Plaintiffs seek to supplement their second amended
- Add additional facts and plaintiffs to Count I's due
process challenge to the Act's ...