United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
G. CORNELIUS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Misti Patterson originally filed this action in the
Bessemer Division of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County,
Alabama, against Defendants Ad Astra Recovery Services, Inc.
(“Ad Astra”), and Speedy Cash, along with several
unnamed defendants, alleging claims under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and state
common law. (Doc. 1-1). Defendants removed the case to
federal court asserting federal question jurisdiction. (Doc.
1). Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 5). The
motion has been fully briefed and is now under submission.
(Docs. 5-1, 8, 14). For the following reasons, the motion is
due to be granted in part and denied in part.
alleges “[o]n dates prior hereto, ” Defendant
Speedy Cash sent her a letter demanding she make payments on
a loan. (Doc. 1-1 at 4). Patterson contends she did not take
out a loan with Speedy Cash and communicated this fact to
Speedy Cash on numerous occasions. (Id. at 4-5). She
states “additional letters were written trying to
resolve this issue and upon reviewing documentation
presented, ” Patterson concluded the loan was a result
of identity theft occurring in the State of California.
(Id. at 5).
Patterson notified Speedy Cash about the identity theft,
“Speedy Cash continued their activities of trying to
force the Plaintiff to make payments on a debt she did not
incur.” (Id.). Speedy Cash then hired Ad Astra
to attempt to collect the debt. (Id.). Further,
despite knowing the debt was disputed and “having
information before it that should have told a reasonable
person that this particular Plaintiff was not the person who
made this debt to Speedy Cash, ” Defendants reported
the debt to credit agencies, including TransUnion and
alleges the actions of Defendants substantially impaired her
ability to borrow funds and caused her to pay higher interest
rates when she did borrow money. (Id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the dismissal of
all or some of the claims in a complaint if the allegations
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The court assumes the
factual allegations in the complaint are true and gives the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences.
Hazewood v. Foundation Financial Group, LLC, 551
F.3d 1223, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). However,
“courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-79 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a
prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for
a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions.”). Nor is it proper to assume the
plaintiff can prove facts he has not alleged or that the
defendants have violated the law in ways that have not been
alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (citing
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983)).
a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id., 550 U.S. at 555 (citations,
brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . .”
Id. Thus, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). In other
words, its “factual content . . . allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
opposition brief, Plaintiff concedes her claims under the
FCRA and RESPA are due to be dismissed. (Doc. 8 at 3-4). The
only remaining claims are those under the FDCPA and
Plaintiff's negligence claim. The court discusses each
argue Plaintiff's claim under the FDCPA is due to be
dismissed for two reasons. First, Defendants contend the
complaint does not specify which provisions of the FDCPA form
the basis for her allegations, thus warranting dismissal.
(Doc. 5-1 at 4). Second, Defendants assert Plaintiff does not
allege either Defendant is a “debt collector, ”
Plaintiff is a “consumer, ” or the obligation to
Speedy Cash is a “debt” as those terms are
defined by the FDCPA. (Id. at 5).
the court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff's
complaint does not name the specific provisions of the FDCPA
forming the basis of her claim, in her opposition brief,
Plaintiff asserts her complaint “states [a] valid
violation of § 1692g and § 1692e” of the
FDCPA. (Doc. 8 at 2). Additionally, although Plaintiff
essentially concedes the other deficiencies in her complaint
with regard to her FDCPA claim, the court is mindful the
complaint was originally filed in the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County under ...