United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate incarcerated at the Childersburg Work Release
Center in Childersburg, Alabama, files this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 complaint alleging a denial of due process to be fairly
considered for parole. Plaintiff names as defendants the
Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Eddie Cook, Jr., Cliff
Walker, Lyn Head, Terry Davis, and Governor Kay Ivey.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and any
other relief the court deems just and proper. He also
requests trial by jury. Upon review, the court concludes that
dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint against the Alabama Board
of Pardons and Paroles and Governor Kay Ivey is appropriate
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles
Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles is not subject to suit
or liability under § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment bars
suit directly against a state or its agencies, regardless of
the relief sought. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Because Plaintiff's
complaint against the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles is
“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
” this defendant is subject to dismissal as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Governor Kay Ivey
names Governor Kay Ivey as a defendant because she succeeded
former Governor Robert Bentley in office. According to the
complaint, Plaintiff challenges matters which occurred during
his June 2016 parole consideration hearing.
extent Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on Governor Ivey
based on respondeat superior, he is entitled to no
relief. Supervisory personnel cannot be liable under §
1983 for a constitutional violation of one of their
subordinates via a theory of respondeat superior or
on the basis of vicarious liability. Monell v. Dep 't
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978) (holding
doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable to
§ 1983 actions); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30
F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory
officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under
either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability). In the absence of any allegation that Governor
Ivey knew of, sanctioned, participated in or was otherwise
“affirmatively linked” to the acts about which
Plaintiff complains, the claims against her are insufficient
to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding that a supervisory official is liable only if
she “personally participate[d] in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or there is a causal connection
between [her] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional
deprivation”). As explained, Plaintiff complains about
matters which occurred during his June 2016 parole
consideration hearing. Kay Ivey did not become Governor of
the State of Alabama until April 10, 2017. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
claims against Governor Ivey are due to be dismissed for
failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants Alabama Board of
Pardons and Paroles and Governor Kay Ivey be DISMISSED with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii);
Defendants Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and Governor
Kay Ivey be DISMISSED as parties to the complaint; and
case regarding the remaining defendants be referred to the