United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division
JABRIL EL BEY EX RELATIONE LAMARCUS KENTRELL JACKSON, Plaintiff,
CITY OF MADISON, et al., Defendants.
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the defendants' motions to
dismiss (Docs. 6, 13, 15), motion to strike discovery (Doc.
22), and motion to strike demand for punitive damages (Doc.
8). Jabril El Bey ex Relatione Lamarcus Kentrell Jackson, who
is representing himself, filed a “legal notice of
removal, ” seeking to remove a state court criminal
action to federal court. Reading Mr. El Bey's
“legal notice” liberally, the Court construes the
filing as a complaint in which Mr. El Bey alleges violations
of his constitutional rights and seeks relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “Generally, to
survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss and meet the
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint
need not contain ‘detailed factual allegations, '
but rather ‘only enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'” Maledy
v. City of Enterprise, 2012 WL 1028176, at *1 (M.D. Ala.
Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). “Specific facts are
not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 evaluates the plausibility of the facts alleged,
and the notice stemming from a complaint's
allegations.” Keene v. Prine, 477 Fed.Appx.
575, 583 (11th Cir. 2012). “Where those two
requirements are met . . . the form of the complaint is not
significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be
granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the legal
theory giving rise to the claim.” Id. This is
particularly true with respect to pro se complaints.
Courts must liberally construe pro se documents.
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. “‘[A] pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'” Id. (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Still, the Court may
not “serve as de facto counsel for a party, or
. . . rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading” to
“sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica
Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept
the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d
1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hill v. White,
321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). The Court
presents Mr. El Bey's allegations accordingly.
Allegations and Procedural Background
complaint, Mr. El Bey alleges that the defendants violated
his constitutional rights by forcing him off a public
highway, detaining him, and confiscating his vehicle without
due process of law. (Doc. 1, p. 3). According to the
complaint, defendant David W. Templeton, an officer of the
City of Madison Police Department, alleged that Mr. El Bey
violated “unconstitutional private foreign corporate
ordinance (not law).” (Doc. 1, p. 3). Mr. El Bey
asserts that Officers Templeton and M. Craft kidnapped him on
Saturday March 25th. (Doc. 1, p. 3). The signature on the warrant
was illegible, and the warrant was not accompanied by a sworn
affidavit of fact by an injured party. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Deputy
T. Johnson of the Limestone County Sheriff's Department
witnessed and recorded the incident on body camera. (Doc. 1,
p. 3). Mr. El Bey alleges that he was “unlawfully
placed in handcuffs that bruised [his] wrists” and was
“taken to Madison municipal complex” where his
“intellectual property (Photograph and Fingerprints)
were taken without consent and under threat.” (Doc. 1,
Thomas R. Parker and other officers of the Madison County
Municipal Court did not answer a Quo Warranto in which Mr. El
Bey asked the state court to explain its jurisdiction. (Doc.
1, p. 3). “Under duress and threat of being unlawfully
kidnapped by the corporate employees, ” Mr. El Bey
contends that he “made a Special Appearance at the
Unconstitutional unlawful venue on American soil.”
(Doc. 1, p. 3). Mr. El Bey alleges that Judge Parker
unlawfully and intentionally conspired to conceal affidavits
and tamper with evidence. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Mr. El Bey adds
that the Madison County Municipal Court is unconstitutional
and did not provide to him due process or the rights secured
by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1,
Bey asserts that he is an “Aboriginal Indigenous
Moorish-American; possessing Free-hold by Inheritance status;
standing squarely affirmed and bound to the Zodiac
Constitution, with all due respect and honors given to the
Constitution for the United States Republic, North
America.” (Doc. 1, p. 2). He asserts that he holds this
status because he is “a descendant of Moroccans and
born in America, with the blood of the Ancient Moabites from
the Land of Moab, who received permission from the Pharaohs
of Egypt to settle and inhabit North-West Africa / North
Gate.” (Doc. 1, p. 2). He asserts that “[t]he
Moors are the founders and are the true possessors of the
present Moroccan Empire; with [their] Canaanite, Hittite and
Amorite brethren, who sojourned from the land of Canaan,
seeking new homes.” (Doc. 1, p. 2).
Our dominion and inhabitation extended from Northeast and
Southwest Africa, across the Great Atlantis, even unto the
present North, South and Central America and the Adjoining
Islands-bound squarely affirmed to THE TREATY OF PEACE AND
FRIENDSHIP OF SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVEN (1787) AD.
superseded by THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP OF EIGHTTEEN
HUNDRED and THIRTY-SIX (1836) A.D. between Morocco and the
United States . . . .
(Doc. 1, p. 1). Based on this asserted heritage, Mr. El Bey
believes that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
City of Madison Municipal Court. (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Bey asks the Court to view him as a Moorish American
National. (Doc. 1, pp. 3, 11). He contends that the charges
against him are unconstitutional and that violations of
various traffic laws “are not arrestable
offenses.” (Doc. 1, pp. 6, 10). Mr. El Bey requests due
process, and he asks the federal courts to stop the
defendants from abusing their “colorable authority,
” to inform the defendants of their obligation to
uphold the Constitution, and to find the defendants
criminally liable and remove them from office. (Doc. 1, p.
11). Mr. El Bey also asks the Court to order the City of
Madison Municipal Court to dismiss and expunge his traffic
ticket or to bring the matter “before a
legitimately-delegated, and competent ‘Court of
Law' of International jurisdiction/venue.” (Doc. 1,
p. 11). Mr. El Bey seeks $75, 000 in compensatory damages and
$75, 000 in punitive damages from Mayor Paul Finley; $75, 000
in compensatory damages and $75, 000 in punitive damages from
the City of Madison Police Department; $75, 000 in
compensatory damages and $75, 000 in punitive damages from
Judge Parker in his individual capacity; and $75, 000 in
compensatory damages and $75, 000 in punitive damages from
Officer Templeton in his individual capacity. (Doc. 1, pp.
Parker's Motion to Dismiss
Parker asks the Court to dismiss the claims against him
because he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. (Doc.
16, p. 4). In the Eleventh Circuit, “[j]udges
are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for
those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,
1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “Like other forms of official
immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not
just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
immunity applies “even when the judge's acts are in
error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her
jurisdiction.” Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239 (citing
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)).
Absolute judicial immunity applies, for example, when a party
alleges that a judge accepted bribes, Bush v. Washington
Mut. Bank, 177 Fed.Appx. 16, 18 (11th Cir. 2006),
knowingly credited false testimony, Armstrong v.
Andrews, 646 Fed.Appx. 705 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 197 (2016), or based a
decision on false evidence, or suborned perjury, Drees v.
Ferguson, 396 Fed.Appx. 656, 658 (11th Cir. 2010).
“Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may
result on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the ...