United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRAY
M. BORDEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Corbin Stone filed this action on July 18, 2016, seeking
judicial review of a final adverse decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for
a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and
supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. Doc. 1. Stone applied for disability
benefits with an alleged disability onset date of January 21,
2013. His applications were denied at the initial
administrative level. Stone then requested and received a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on July 18, 2014. Following that hearing,
the ALJ denied Stone's claims on October 27, 2014. The
Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review,
making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the
“Commissioner”).[1]
With
briefing complete, this case is now ripe for review pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The parties
have consented to the entry of a final judgment by the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 73.1 of the Local Rules for the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Docs. 9 & 10. Based upon a review of the evidentiary
record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant authority,
the court finds that the Commissioner's decision is due
to be REVERSED and REMANDED, as explained below.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
court reviews a social security case to determine whether the
Commissioner's decision “is supported by
substantial evidence and based upon proper legal
standards.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436,
1439 (11th Cir. 1997). The court “may not decide the
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner, ” but rather it
“must defer to the Commissioner's decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence.” Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the court must affirm the
Commissioner's decision “if it is supported by
substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were
applied.” Kelly v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1213
(11th Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d
1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997)).
“Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla-i.e., the evidence must do
more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a
fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support the
conclusion.” Jones ex rel. T.J.J. v. Astrue,
2011 WL 1706465, at *1 (M.D. Ala. May 5, 2011) (citing
Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). The court must scrutinize
the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the
decision reached. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1010
(11th Cir. 1987). “If the Commissioner's decision
is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will
affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary
result as a finder of fact, and even if the court finds that
the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's
decision.” Jones, 2011 WL 1706465, at *2
(citing Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3
(11th Cir. 1991)). The court will reverse the
Commissioner's decision on plenary review if the decision
applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with
sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner
properly applied the law. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936
F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991); Jones, 2011 WL
1706465, at *2 (citing Keeton v. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
1994)). There is no presumption that the Commissioner's
conclusions of law are valid. Id.
II.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To
qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i). A physical or mental
impairment is “an impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(3). Stone bears the burden of proving that he is
disabled, and he is responsible for producing evidence to
support his claim. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
Determination
of disability under the Social Security Act requires a
five-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in sequence:
(1) Is the claimant presently unemployed?
(2) Is the claimant's impairment severe?
(3) Does the claimant's impairment meet or equal one of
the specific impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1?
(4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former
occupation?
(5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within
the economy?
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir.
1986). “An affirmative answer to any of the above
questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer
to any question, other than step three, leads to a
determination of ‘not disabled.'”
Id. at 1030 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)-(f)). “Once the finding is made that a
claimant cannot return to prior work the burden of proof
shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citing Gibson v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1516
(11th Cir. 1985)). Still, the claimant bears the
“ultimate burden of proving disability, and is
responsible for furnishing or identifying medical or other
evidence regarding his impairments.” Griffis v.
Astrue, 610 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
(citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(2011); Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218
(11th Cir. 1991); McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617,
619 (11th Cir. 1987); and 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
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