United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Scott Coogler United States Judge
plaintiff, Debra France Massenburg, appeals from the decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a
period of disability, Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”), and Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”). Ms. Massenburg timely pursued and
exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Massenburg was 57 years old at the time of the Administrative
Law Judge's (“ALJ's”) decision, and she
has a high school education. (Tr. at 32.) Her past work
experiences include employment as a mattress salesperson,
telemarketer, secretary, and mortgage loan officer. (Tr. at
48-49, 203, 210-13, 227-33.) Ms. Massenburg claims that she
became disabled on April 14, 2013, due to chronic stress
syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), major depression with psychosis,
agoraphobia, panic disorder, memory loss, and cervical
degenerative disease with multiple levels of foraminal
stenosis. (Tr. at 30, 203.)
Social Security Administration has established a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether an
individual is disabled and thus eligible for DIB or SSI.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;
see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order
until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if
no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next
step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to
determine whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (“SGA”). See Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the
plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to
the next step.
second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined
severity of the plaintiff's medically determinable
physical and mental impairments. See Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An
individual impairment or combination of impairments that is
not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy
the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding of
not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision depends
on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart
v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971)
(concluding that “substantial medical evidence in the
record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff
was not disabled).
the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the
plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments
meets or is medically equal to the criteria of an impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment
and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the
evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does
not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the
evaluator must determine the plaintiff's residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to
the fourth step. See Id. §§ 404.1520(e),
416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to
determine whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the
requirements of his past relevant work. See Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the
plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does
not prevent him from performing his past relevant work, the
evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See
fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the
plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience in
order to determine whether the plaintiff can make an
adjustment to other work. See Id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can
perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled.
Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform
other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g),
the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
Massenburg met the insured status requirements through the
date of her decision. (Tr. at 12.) She further determined
that Ms. Massenburg has not engaged in SGA since the alleged
onset of her disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ,
Plaintiff's anxiety disorder and an affective disorder
are considered “severe” based on the requirements
set forth in the regulations. (Tr. at 13.) However, she found
that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Id.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff
had the following RFC: she can perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels with the following nonexertional
limitations: she can understand and remember simple
instructions, can carry out short and simple instructions,
and attend and concentrate for two-hour periods to complete
an eight-hour workday on simple tasks with customary breaks
and rests during the regular workday. (Tr. at 15.) In
addition, the ALJ found that interaction and contact with the
general public should be casual, criticism and feedback from
supervisors and coworkers should be casual, and changes in
the workplace should be gradually introduced. (Id.)
to the ALJ, Ms. Massenburg is unable to perform any of her
past relevant work, she is an “individual closely
approaching advanced age, ” and she has a “high
school education and is able to communicate in English”
as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at
18-19.) Enlisting the aid of a Vocational Expert
(“VE”) and using Medical-Vocational Rule 201.25
as a guideline, the ALJ found that there are a significant
number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff is
capable of performing, such as hand packager, janitor, and a
warehouse worker. (Id.) The ALJ concluded her
findings by stating that Plaintiff “was not under a
‘disability, ' as defined in the Social Security
Act, at any time through the date of this decision.”
(Tr. at 20.)
Standard of Review
Court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social
Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is
limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of
the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards
were applied. See Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
544 F. App'x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,
1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference to the
factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings
are supported by substantial evidence, but applies close
scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,
1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence
standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.'” Parker v.
Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if
this Court finds that the proof preponderates ...