United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
WYSTERIA W. MILES, Plaintiff,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
G. CORNELIUS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Wysteria W. Miles appeals from the decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying her application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI"”) and
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff timely pursued and exhausted her administrative
remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for
review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision
is due to be affirmed.
FACTS, FRAMEWORK, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
was fifty-one years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge's (“ALJ's”) decision. (R. 163). She
attended one year of college and speaks English. (R. 244).
Her past relevant work includes fast food worker, nursery
school attendant, and hand packager. (R. 20, 71-72). These
jobs are classified at the medium or heavy exertional level.
(Id.). Plaintiff claimed an amended onset date of
September 14, 2013, and stated she had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since that
time. (R. 13, 15, 211).
evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of
eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274,
1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a
determination whether the claimant is performing SGA. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged
in SGA, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops.
Id. If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the
Commissioner proceeds to consider the combined effects of all
the claimant's physical and mental impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These
impairments must be severe and must meet durational
requirements before a claimant will be found disabled.
Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in
the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341
(5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not
severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the
analysis continues to step three, at which the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant's impairments meet the
severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairments
fall within this category, the claimant will be found
disabled without further consideration. Id. If the
impairments do not fall within the listings, the Commissioner
determines the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
four the Commissioner determines whether the impairments
prevent the claimant from returning to past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If
the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, he
or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id.
If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth step, at which the
Commissioner considers the claimant's RFC, as well as the
claimant's age, education, and past work experience, to
determine whether he or she can perform other work.
Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, he or
she is not disabled. Id.
the sequential evaluation process, ALJ Bruce W. MacKenzie
found Plaintiff had not engaged in SGA since the alleged
onset of her disability. (R. 15). At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
diabetes mellitus (DM), type II; cervical pain syndrome; and
degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the cervical spine, worse
at ¶ 5-C6, moderate. (R. 15-16).
three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments meeting or medically equaling any
of the listed impairments. (R. 16-17). Before proceeding to
step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR §§
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the following limitations:
[T]he claimant is able to frequently use hand controls
bilaterally. She can frequently reach overhead bilaterally.
She can frequently climb ramps and stairs but should never
climb ladders or scaffolds. She is able to frequently
balance, stoop, kneel and crouch and occasionally crawl. The
claimant should never be exposed to unprotected heights or
operate commercial motor vehicles. She can tolerate
occasional workplace vibration. She would be limited to
routine and repetitive tasks and simple work related
decisions. In addition to normal workday breaks, she would be
off-task 5% of an 8-hour workday (non-consecutive minutes).
four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any
of her past relevant work. (R. 19-20). Because the
Plaintiff's RFC did not allow for the full range of light
work, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert
(“VE”) in finding a significant number of jobs in
the national economy Plaintiff can perform. (R. 21). The ALJ
concluded by finding Plaintiff was not disabled at the fifth
STANDARD OF REVIEW
court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social
Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is
limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of
the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards
were applied. See Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
544 Fed.Appx. 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2004)). A court gives deference to the factual findings
of the Commissioner, provided those findings are supported by
substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal
conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400
(11th Cir. 1996).
a court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits
administrative decision makers to act with considerable
latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
an administrative agency's finding from being supported
by substantial evidence.'” Parker v.
Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if a
court finds that the proof preponderates ...