United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE CAPEL, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Matthew
Ivey (“Ivey”), an Alabama inmate proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking damages and payment of
his medical bills arising from injuries he sustained while
working on a garbage truck. Additionally, Ivey complains he
was denied adequate medical care for his injuries while
incarcerated at the Bullock County Jail. Named as Defendants
are Bullock County Commissioner Ronald Smith, Office
Executive Director of the Bullock County Waste Department,
Robert Kendrick, Sheriff Raymond Rodgers, and Chief Jailer
Curtis Pritchett. Docs. 1, 9. Upon review, the court
concludes Ivey's claims against Bullock County
Commissioner Ronald Smith, Office Executive Director of the
Bullock County Waste Department, and Robert Kendrick are due
to be dismissed prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii).[1]
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)
Because
Ivey is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court
reviews his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under § 1915(e) (2), a court is required to dismiss a
complaint proceeding in forma pauperis if it
determines that an action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. A claim is frivolous when it “has little or no
chance of success, ” that is, when it appears
“from the face of the complaint that the factual
allegations are clearly baseless or that the legal theories
are indisputably meritless.”[2] Carroll v. Gross,
984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993); accord Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (stating that a claim
is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact”). A claim is frivolous if it
“lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A claim is frivolous as a
matter of law where, among other things, the defendants are
immune from suit, id. at 327, the claim seeks to
enforce a right that clearly does not exist, id., or
there is an affirmative defense that would defeat the claim,
such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia
Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th
Cir. 1990). Courts are accorded “not only the authority
to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim based on indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce
the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A
complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted “only if it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.
1997) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)'s language
tracks the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).
B.
Commissioner Ronald Smith and Office Executive Director
Bullock County Waste Department
Ivey
filed suit against County of Bullock Commissioner,
“Office Executive Director Bullock County Waste
Department, ” and “Mr. Robert.”
See Doc. 1. On December 13, 2017, the court ordered
Ivey to file an amendment to his complaint which named the
individuals personally responsible for the alleged violations
of his constitutional rights as described in the complaint
and which specifically described how each named defendant
acted in a manner which deprived him of his constitutional
rights. Doc. 8. In Ivey's amendment to the complaint he
clarifies the identities of “County of Bullock
Commissioner” and “Mr. Robert” as,
respectively, Commissioner Ronald Smith and Robert Kendrick.
See Docs. 9, 11. Despite the admonitions in the
court's December 13 order, however, Ivey's amendment
fails to allege what actions or omissions Commissioner Ronald
Smith or “Office Executive Director Bullock County
Waste Department” engaged in which allegedly resulted
in a violation of his constitutional rights. See id.
“[S]ection
1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection
between the actions taken by a particular person under color
of state law and the constitutional deprivation.”
LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir.
1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This
Circuit has held that a court properly dismisses defendants
where a prisoner, other than naming the defendant in the
caption, states no allegations that associate the defendants
with the alleged constitutional violation. Douglas v.
Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st
Cir. 1980) (“While we do not require technical niceties
in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with
some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant
caused a legal wrong.”)); see also Potter v.
Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam). Here, Ivey identifies no affirmative action
taken by Defendants Commissioner Smith or “Office
Executive Director Bullock County Waste Department, ”
and thus, asserts no connection between the conduct
complained of and the actions of these defendants regarding
the alleged unconstitutional deprivations. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007))
(“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
To the
extent the basis for Ivey's complaint and amendment to
the complaint against Commissioner Smith and “Office
Executive Director Bullock County Waste Department” is
that Commissioner Smith and the Director of the Bullock
County Waste Department are responsible for the conduct of
their subordinates, the law is settled that supervisory
personnel cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a
constitutional violation of one of their subordinates via a
theory of respondeat superior or on the basis of
vicarious liability. Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978) (doctrine of
respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983
actions); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390,
1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a
plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the
actions of their subordinates under either a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability); see
also Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding that a supervisory official is liable only if
he “personally participate[d] in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection
between [his] actions ... and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.”). Because Ivey fails to allege much less
indicate Defendants Commissioner Smith and “Office
Executive Director Bullock County Waste Department”
were personally involved in the constitutional violations
about which he complains or a causal connection exists
between these defendants' actions and the alleged
constitutional violation, Ivey's complaint and amendment
thereto against Commissioner Smith and “Office
Executive Director Bullock County Waste Department” is
subject to dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The
court also notes the Bullock County Commission and its
individual members are absolutely immune from monetary
damages for claims arising from the appropriation of funds
for the maintenance and operation of a county jail. See
Woods v. Gamel, 132 F.3d 1417, 1420 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding Alabama county commissioners are entitled to
absolute legislative immunity). Neither the county commission
nor its individual members are responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the Bullock County Jail. Under Alabama law,
“an Alabama sheriff acts exclusively for the state
rather than for the county in operating a county jail.”
Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285,
1288 (11th Cir. 1998). “Alabama counties have no duties
with respect to the daily operation of the county jails and
no authority to dictate how the jails are run.”
Id. at 1291. “Alabama counties [also] are not
liable under a theory of respondeat superior for a
sheriff's official acts that are tortious.”
McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 789
(1997). Accordingly, Ivey's claims against Commissioner
Smith are subject to dismissal on this basis as well.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C.
Robert Kendrick
According
to Ivey's complaint, Robert Kendrick
(“Kendrick”) is an employee of the waste
department in Union Springs, Alabama. On July 5, 2017,
Kendrick was working a garbage pickup detail with Ivey. Ivey
maintains Kendrick, the driver of the garbage truck, was
talking on his cell phone and not paying attention.
Kendrick's inattention caused him to drive past a garbage
can. On realizing his mistake, Kendrick slammed the brakes
causing Ivey to be thrown to the side. Ivey complains the
injuries he sustained resulted from Kendrick's negligence
in the performance of his job duties. Docs. 1, 9.
The law
is settled that mere negligence resulting in unintended loss
of or injury to life, liberty, or property does not implicate
the due process clause and will not support an action under
§ 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986). The protections of the Constitution “are just
not triggered by lack of due care by [government
actors].” Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
348 (1986); Hernandez v. Florida Dept. of
Corrections, 281 Fed. App'x. 862, 866 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Allegations of negligent conduct do not state a
constitutional claim and thus, are not actionable under
§ 1983.”). “Individuals do not have a
constitutional right (1) to be free from a government
employee's negligence, even if it causes an injury or (2)
to have the government protect them from such an
injury.” Davis v. Corrections Corp. of Am.,
2008 WL 539057, at *3 (N.D. Fla., Feb. 22, 2008) (citing ...