United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
D. ANGELINA KENNEDY, Plaintiff,
WARREN PROPERTIES, LLC, et al., Defendants.
K. DuBOSE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
action is before the Court on sua sponte review of
the docket. On March 10, 2017, Kennedy filed a complaint in
this Court (doc. 1). On April 4, 2017, she amended her
complaint (doc. 4). Kennedy alleges violations of the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq, based on race
and violations of § 3617, the anti-retaliation provision
of the Act, which makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate or
threaten a person in the exercise of their rights protected
by the Act. Kennedy also alleges violations of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (“Class of
One” based on race), criminal conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 241 and § 371, and civil conspiracy under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). In support Kennedy alleges specific
actions taken by the twenty-four individual and corporate
Defendants from 2002 until 2012 while she was a tenant at
Warren House Apartments. Among them are Defendants Nicole
Kidd and Veronica Young.
has provided the Court with Proof of Service indicating that
a private process server personally served Kidd on July 14,
2017 (doc. 29). Kennedy also provided the Court with Proof of
Service that Young was served by certified mail on June 23,
2017 (doc. 18). Young and Kidd have not filed an answer or
otherwise responded to the amended complaint.
Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 41(b) for the Southern District
of Alabama, Whenever a served Defendant has failed to answer
or otherwise defend within six (6) months from the filing of
the complaint and the Plaintiff has not sought default and
default judgment, the Court upon notice may dismiss the
action for failure to prosecute, in accordance with
S.D. Ala. CivLR 41(b).
than six months has passed since the amended complaint was
filed on April 4, 2017. Kennedy had not sought default and
default judgment as to Kidd or Young. Therefore, she was
ordered to show cause on or before December 29, 2017, why
this Court should not dismiss Kidd and Young from this action
for failure to prosecute her claims against them (doc. 67).
The order also served as notice to Kennedy, as required by
Civil Local Rule 41(b), that in accordance with the
Court's inherent authority to manage the cases on its
docket and Rule 41(b)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court intended to dismiss this action without prejudice
as to Kidd and Young for failure to prosecute.
has now filed a response to the Court's order (doc. 69).
Kennedy indicates that she does not intend to apply for
default or default judgment as to Kidd and Young (doc. 69, p.
1 (“Who I am is why I couldn't request a default
judgment”), p. 5 (“These 2 defendants were used
as the battering ram to hurt me, endanger me, effect my life
and my credibility. But they could not have done it alone.
All the other guilty defendants have been exonerated, how am
I supposed to ask for a default judgment against these
two…” “…the court may do as it sees
notice having been given, this action is dismissed without
prejudice as to Kidd and Young for failure to prosecute.
See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-32, 82
S.Ct. 1386, 1389 (1962) (Finding that inherent power is
“the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases”, rejecting the
contention that Rule 41(b) "prohibits involuntary
dismissals for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute except
upon motion by the defendant", and interpreting Rule
41(b) not to restrict the court's inherent power to
"dismiss sua sponte for lack of
prosecution"); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, (1991) (A district court
has inherent authority to manage its own docket “so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.”); Townsend v. Beck, 295 Fed.Appx. 950,
951-952 (11th Cir. 2008) (A “district court may act on
its own motion to dismiss a claim under Rule 41(b)”)
(citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630)). See Jacobs v.
Clayton Cty. Solicitor Gen. Office, 685 F.Appx. 824, 826
(11th Cir. 2017 (“A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is an
adjudication on the merits and is thus a dismissal with
prejudice unless the district court states
action remains pending as to defendants Richard Colbourne,
Frank R. Warren, Joanne C. Warren and Ronald T. Warren.
 Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (“Involuntary
dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may
move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless
the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this
subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except
one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or ...