United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
F. MOORER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a
complaint filed by Lamarcus Murice Crenshaw, an indigent
state inmate. In the instant complaint, Crenshaw challenges
the constitutionality of actions arising from his
classification as a restricted offender. Crenshaw seeks only
“injunctive relief to remove the restrictive status
from being my classification code.” Doc. No. 1 at 4.
to the orders of this court, the defendants filed a special
report supported by relevant evidentiary materials, including
affidavits, in which they address the claims for relief
presented by Crenshaw. The evidentiary materials demonstrate
that the defendants have determined that Crenshaw is due to
be removed from restricted offender status. Doc. No. 11-1,
Doc. No. 11-2 and Doc. No. 11-3. The defendants therefore
ague this case should be dismissed as moot since the
plaintiff has received the requested relief. Doc. No. 11 at
light of the foregoing, the court issued an order directing
Crenshaw to file a response to the arguments set forth in the
defendants' written report. Doc. No. 12. The order
advised Crenshaw that his failure to respond to the report
would be treated by the court “as an
abandonment of the claims set forth in the complaint and as a
failure to prosecute this action.”
Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the
order “specifically cautioned [the plaintiff]
that [his failure] to file a response in compliance with the
directives of this order” would result in the
dismissal of this civil action. Id. (emphasis in
original). The time allotted Crenshaw for filing a response
in compliance with the directives of this order expired on
January 12, 2018. Crenshaw has failed to file a requisite
response in opposition to the defendant's written report.
The court therefore concludes that this case should be
dismissed as moot.
do not sit to render advisory opinions. North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). An actual controversy
must exist at all times during the pendency of a case.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974).
In cases where the only relief requested is injunctive in
nature, events which occur subsequent to the filing of the
complaint can render the matter moot. National Black
Police Assoc. v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 350
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (change in statute); Williams v.
Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (transfer of
prisoner); Tawwab v. Metz 554 F.2d 22, 23 (2nd Cir.
1977) (change in policy).
III of the United States Constitution confers jurisdiction on
the district courts to hear and determine “cases”
or “controversies.” The mootness doctrine derives
directly from the case or controversy limitation because
“an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an
active case or controversy.” Adler v. Duval County
Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997).
“Put another way, ‘a case is moot when it no
longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the
court can give meaningful relief.'” Florida
Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of
Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (11th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173,
1175 (11th Cir. 1993)); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
95 (1968) (“Where the question sought to be adjudicated
has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the
complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented.”);
Saladin v. Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 693 (11th
Cir. 1987) (“A case is moot when the issues presented
are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation, such as
where . . . interim relief or events have eradicated the
effects of the alleged violation.”); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (“[A] case is
moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live'
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
actions occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit whereby
the plaintiff obtains the requested relief, then the case is
moot and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Hall v.
Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam). In such
instances, dismissal is required because mootness is
jurisdictional. See Florida Ass'n of Rehab.
Facilities, 225 F.3d at 1227 n.14 (“The question
of mootness is . . . one which a federal court must resolve
before it assumes jurisdiction [over the merits of a
complaint].”). “Any decision on the merits of a
moot case or issue would be an impermissible advisory
opinion.” Id. at 1217 (citing Hall,
396 U.S.at 48, 90 S.Ct. at 201-02.
has received the relief requested from this court in that the
defendants have determined he is not subject to
classification as a restricted offender and are in the
process of removing or have removed him from restricted
offender status. The court finds that there is no reasonable
expectation or demonstrated probability that Crenshaw will
return to this custody classification during his present term
of confinement. Under the circumstances of this case, the
request for injunctive relief, the only relief sought by
Crenshaw, is moot. County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 481-82 (1982); Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777,
780 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that past exposure to potential
illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a pending case
or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied
by any continuing present injury or real and immediate threat
of repeated injury).
it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this
case be DISMISSED without prejudice as moot.
further ORDERED that on or before February 12, 2018 the
parties may file objections to the Recommendation. A party
must specifically identify the factual findings and legal
conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is
made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections to the
Recommendation will not be considered. Failure to file
written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and
recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo
determination by the District Court of legal and factual
issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of
the party to challenge on appeal the District Court's
order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
accepted or adopted by the District Court except ...