United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
James Dlester Crandle, an Alabama pretrial detainee
proceeding pro se, initiated the above-styled action
by filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). The petition has been referred
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge who, under S.D. Ala.
GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), is authorized to require responses, issue
orders to show cause and any other orders necessary to
develop a complete record, and to prepare a report and
recommendation to the District Judge as to appropriate
disposition of the petition, in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and Rules 8(b) and 10 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts. See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b);
(12/27/2017 electronic referral).
conducted preliminary review of the petition under Rule 4 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the undersigned finds
that it “plainly appears” that Crandle is not
entitled to relief in this Court because he has not shown he
is entitled to habeas relief on some of his claims, and
because has failed to exhaust his state court remedies as to
the rest. Thus, the petition is due to be DISMISSED
without prejudice as to the unexhausted claims, and
otherwise DISMISSED, without first ordering
an answer from the Respondent. The undersigned also finds
that, in conjunction with the dismissal of his petition,
Crandle should be DENIED both a Certificate
of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal.
allegations in Crandle's petition (Doc. 1),
is currently being detained in the Metro Jail of Mobile,
Alabama, while awaiting trial on a charge of capital murder,
previously upgraded from felony murder, pursuant to the order
of Judge James T. Patterson of the Circuit Court of Mobile
County (Case No. CC-2017-3964). Crandle claims that he has
been denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. He also alleges
violations of the “Fourth Amendment” “due
to a prior on [his] record that [he] ha[s] already served
time for 2 years ago” (the undersigned construes this
claim as alleging a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment); various constitutional violations
based on insufficiency of the evidence against him, which he
claims consist only of “hearsays, and no concret [sic]
evidence like a weapon, DNA, video/audio and etc.[;]”
and that Judge Patterson improperly revoked his bond after
his charge was upgraded. As relief, he requests that he
“be granted a reasonable bond, ” and that he
receive “a dismissal of charges…”
filed motions for speedy trial and to set or reduce bond on
October 31, 2017, which Judge Patterson denied on November
30, 2017. Crandle claims his appointed counsel told him Judge
Patterson “have the rights to do what he done on
11/30/17” and that Crandle “can't do nothing
about it.” Crandle admits he has not pursued any
appeals of Judge Patterson's decision, claiming he
doesn't “know how to file an appeal, and [his]
appointed counsel will not help [him] again to get back in
front of a Judge or file a speedy trial…”
§ 2241 Petition
pretrial detainee may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla.,
377 F.3d 1258, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The present
habeas petition was initially brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. However, because this petition for habeas relief
is a pre-trial petition it would only be properly asserted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” (citing
Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1060 (11th Cir.
2003)); Tooten v. Shevin, 493 F.2d 173, 175 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1974) (“A prejudgment petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Prisoners in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court file habeas corpus petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.”). However, the petitioner detainee must
“exhaust all available state remedies as a prelude to
th[e] action.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973). See also
Tooten, 493 F.2d at 175 & n.6 (“Although
federal courts have the power to release state prisoners
before trial, the exhaustion requirement must be
fulfilled.” (citing Braden, 410 U.S. 484;
Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973); Ex
parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)); Hughes, 377
F.3d at 1262 & n.4 (citing Fain v. Duff as
controlling “the exhaustion requirements necessary to
obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”).
“The Exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted
requirement, now considered jurisdictional, which is firmly
rooted in sound considerations of federal-state
comity.” Tooten, 493 F.2d at 175 (footnote
omitted). See also Hughes, 377 F.3d at 1262 n.4
(“In Fain v. Duff, the former Fifth Circuit
explained that ‘[t]he exhaustion of state remedies ...
was [originally] left in the discretion of the district
court, [but] the requirement soon became known as a
jurisdictional one.' ” (quoting Fain, 488
F.2d at 223)).
Two significant interests have been identified which are
protected by the policy of exhaustion.
First, exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in
the application and enforcement of federal law. Early federal
intervention in state criminal proceedings would tend to
remove federal questions from the state courts, isolate those
courts from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their
understanding of and hospitality to federally protected
interests. Second, exhaustion preserves orderly
administration of state judicial business, preventing the
interruption of state adjudication by federal habeas
proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach state
appellate courts, which can develop and correct errors of
state and federal law and most effectively supervise and
impose uniformity on trial courts.
These fundamental interests underlying the exhaustion
doctrine are satisfied by giving the state an initial
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of
its prisoners' federal rights.
Tooten, 493 F.2d at 175-76 (footnote omitted).
“Federal habeas corpus should not be used as a pretrial
motion forum for state prisoners.” Id. at 177
in Braden…, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35
L.Ed.2d 443[, t]he Court there reiterated the long
established principle that ‘federal habeas corpus does
not lie, absent ‘special circumstances', to
adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state
criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state
court.' Id. at 490, 93 S.Ct. at 1127, 35 L.Ed.2d
at 449. The Court held, however, that there was an important
distinction between a petitioner who seeks to ‘abort a
state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of
state judicial processes' by litigating a speedy trial
defense to a prosecution prior to trial, and one who seeks
only to enforce the state's obligation to bring him
promptly to trial. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374,
89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969). This distinction
apparently turns upon the type of relief sought: an attempt
to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution
is of the first type, while an attempt to force the state to
go to trial is of the second. While the former ...