United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, United States District Judge
False Claims Act (“FCA”) case is set for trial
beginning January 29, 2018. The FCA allows private citizens,
known as relators, to bring lawsuits on behalf of the
Government against companies and individuals that allegedly
have defrauded the Government. Barry Taul (hereinafter
“Plaintiff”) is the relator in this action. The
Defendants are Nagel Enterprises, Inc. and Jed Nagel
case is now before this Court on the Defendants' Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion”),
doc. 136, filed on December 28, 2017. The Motion is untimely
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that “[a]fter the pleadings
are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(c). Given the pending trial date, the deadline to file
motions, exhibit lists, and witness lists, and given the
Court's briefing order applicable to all potentially
dispositive motions, set out in its Uniform Initial Order,
consideration of the Motion, if briefing were to occur as set
out in that briefing order, will delay trial. It also is filed
after the deadlines set out in the Court's Scheduling
Order and has been filed without even asking the Court to
reopen that Order, much less any showing by the Defendants
that they meet the standard for such re-opening.
Additionally, the Motion fails on the merits.
Defendants have filed multiple (timely) motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment, and one (permitted-by-this-court
but otherwise untimely) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
all of which have been ruled upon. More specifically,
Defendants have filed four sets of potentially dispositive
Defendants filed a Motion To Dismiss (doc. 15) the claims in
the Initial Complaint (doc. 1). After the Court denied that
motion, the Relator filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 47).
Defendants moved for summary judgment in July 2015. (Doc.
61). The Court (1) granted the motion as to Plaintiff's
retaliation claims other than those based on the events of
Fall 2012, finding that all such pre-Fall 2012 claims were
time-barred; (2) denied summary judgment on all other
claims on all asserted bases, including that they were
time-barred; and (3) granted summary judgment against
Defendants and in favor of the Plaintiff on the issues of
release, accord, and satisfaction. (Doc. 80).
in October 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the statute of
limitations had expired on all claims. (Doc. 85). The
Court granted in part and denied in part and specified that
the following claims remain for trial:
Counts I, II, and III: FCA claims brought pursuant
to 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A-C), occurring
after January 13, 2008;
Count IV: FCA retaliation claims after Fall
Count V: FCA claims based on violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute, where such violations occurred
after January 13, 2008.
(Doc. 98)., 
the Court permitted Defendants to file a motion for judgment
on the pleadings on the specific issue of “whether
retaliation claims under Section 3730(h) of the False Claims
Act may only be brought by employees as to the terms and
conditions of their employment, thereby barring recovery for
any post-employment retaliation claim.” (Doc. 114). The
Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
(Doc. 116). The Court granted that motion on November 1,
2017, and granted judgment to the Defendants as to
Plaintiff's remaining claims in Count IV (FCA retaliation
claims after Fall 2012). (Doc. 120).
same statute of limitations argument raised in the current
Motion has previously been raised by the Defendants and
addressed by this Court. The Defendants have presented no
additional facts or law to call this Court's prior
rulings on this issues into question, nor does their Motion
meet the standard applicable to a motion for reconsideration.
the Motion is DENIED as: (1) untimely under
Rule 12(c); (2) untimely under the Court's Scheduling
Order (and with no request that the Scheduling Order be
re-opened, nor any showing that the Scheduling Order is due
to be re-opened); (3) an untimely and insufficiently
developed motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior