from Mobile Circuit Court (DR-06-501848.03),
Ladd Corrigan Young ("the mother") appeals from
separate, but almost identical, judgments entered by the
Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial court") in
postdivorce contempt and modification proceedings between the
mother and Richard E. Corrigan ("the father"). We
affirm the judgments in part and reverse the judgments in
December 17, 2008, the parties were divorced by a judgment
entered by the trial court. That judgment, among other
things, awarded the parties joint legal custody of their
child; awarded the mother "primary" physical
custody of the child; awarded the father visitation with the
child every other weekend, on Wednesday of every week, for
one month during the summer, every Father's Day, on the
father's birthday, and on alternating holidays; ordered
the father to pay child support for the child; ordered the
father to "provide major medical insurance for the ...
child"; ordered the parties to "equally divide all
uninsured medical and dental expenses not otherwise covered
by insurance after deductibles and co-pays are met by [the
mother]"; and ordered the parties to "equally
divide the costs of the attendance of the ... child ... at
UMS-Wright Preparatory School." The father was also
awarded the "first right of refusal to have the minor
child of the parties stay with him in the event [the] Mother
has the need for a babysitter."
30, 2014, the father filed a petition for a rule nisi, mother
haalleging that the d failed to allow the child to visit him
on his birthday and had failed to offer him the right of
first refusal when she needed a babysitter for the child;
that case was assigned case no. DR-06-501848.03. On June 10,
2014, the mother filed an answer. On July 21, 2014, the
father filed a motion seeking to enforce his
summer-visitation rights; he also requested sanctions for the
mother's failure to allow him to exercise his summer
visitation with the child. The father filed an amended
petition for a rule nisi on July 22, 2014.
January 14, 2015, the mother filed a petition requesting that
the trial court hold the father in contempt for his failure
to pay child support; she also requested both a suspension
and a decrease of the father's visitation. That case was
assigned case no. DR-06-501848.04. On June 26, 2015, the
father filed in case no. DR-06-501848.03 another amended
petition for a rule nisi, alleging that the mother had
continued to interfere with his visitation. On that same
date, the trial court entered orders in both cases appointing
a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child.
On August 14, 2015, the mother filed in case no.
DR-06-501848.04 an amended petition seeking to hold the
father in contempt and to modify the father's
March 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order, based upon
an agreement of the parties, stating that a "visitation
evaluation" would be conducted on the parties with the
father paying the costs of the evaluation.
trial, the trial court entered, on November 2, 2016,
separate, but almost identical, judgments finding the mother
in contempt of court for allowing the child "to make her
own decisions as to visitation with the [father]";
providing that the mother could purge herself of contempt by
ensuring that the father receive "rehabilitative
visitation, commencing November 4, 2016 throughout that
weekend" and, "[t]hereafter, every weekend until
January 6, 2017"; finding the father in contempt of
court "for his willful failure to pay child support and
tuition" for the child; modifying the father's
monthly child-support obligation to $896.60 in compliance
with Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.; ordering the mother and
the father to "confer so that major decisions affecting
the welfare of the child shall be determined jointly[,
including, ] but not limited to, [decisions regarding]
education, discipline, religion, medical, and the general
upbringing of the child"; ordering the mother and the
father to "divide their custodial periods of time on a
weekly basis, with the exchange occurring on Fridays afer
school, or at 6:00 p.m. if there is no school on any given
Friday"; ordering the mother to pay "$5, 800.00 for
... reasonable attorney's fees and $3, 700.00 for
counseling fees"; ordering the parties to "maintain
health insurance on the minor child in the same manner in
which it currently exists"; and ordering the mother and
the father to each "pay one-half of said insurance
premium expense monthly and [to] pay one-half of all
uninsured and/or unreimbursed medical, dental,
pharmaceutical, psychological, psychiatric, optical or
orthodontic expenses of the ... child, including
November 3, 2016, the guardian ad litem for the child filed a
postjudgment motion. On December 1, 2016, the mother filed a
postjudgment motion. On January 27, 2017, the trial court
amended the judgments regarding matters not pertinent to
these appeals. On February 10, 2017, the mother filed her
notices of appeal.
appeal, the mother first argues that the trial court's
judgments are void because, she says, the trial court failed
to afford her due process to the extent that the judgments
modify portions of the divorce judgment by providing for the
payment of health-insurance costs, by ordering her to pay
counselor fees, and by modifying the legal and physical
custody of the child when there were no claims pending
requesting such relief.
"'"A judgment is void only if the court which
rendered it  lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or
 of the parties, or  if it acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process."' Neal v.
Neal, 856 So.2d 766, 781 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
Seventh Wonder v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364
So.2d 1173, 1174 (Ala. 1978)). See also Smith v.
Clark, 468 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala. 1985); Cassioppi v.
Damico, 536 So.2d 938, 940 (Ala. 1988); Pollard v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 539 So.2d 225, 228 (Ala.
1989); Satterfield v. Winston Indus., Inc.,
553 So.2d 61, 64 (Ala. 1989); Fisher v. Amaraneni,
565 So.2d 84, 87 (Ala. 1990); Hughes v. Cox, 601
So.2d 465, 467-68 (Ala. 1992); Greene v. Connelly,
628 So.2d 346, 351 (Ala. 1993); and Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R.
"'"[I]t is established by the decisions in this
and in Federal jurisdictions that due process of law
means notice, a hearing according to that notice, and a
judgment entered in accordance with such notice and
"'Frahn v. Greyling Realization Corp., 239
Ala. 580, 583, 195 So. 758, 761 (1940) (emphasis
M.H. v. Jer.W., 51 So.3d 334, 337 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010) (quoting Neal v. Neal, 856 So.2d 766, 781-82
"In Carden v. Penney, 362 So.2d 266 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1978), this court explained that Rule 54(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P., authorizes a trial court to grant to a party the
relief to which that party is entitled 'irrespective of
the request for relief contained in the pleadings.' 362
So.2d at 268.
"'However, Rule 54(c) does not sanction the granting
of relief not requested in the pleadings where it appears
that a party's failure to ask for particular relief has
substantially prejudiced the opposing party. Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45
L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Rental Development Corporation of
America v. Lavery, 304 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1962);
Penney v. Carden, [356 So.2d 1188 (Ala. 1978)].
Moreover, if the relief granted pursuant to Rule 54(c) is not
justified by the proof or is justified by proof which the
opposing party has not had an opportunity to challenge, the
relief granted should not be sustained on appeal. See 10
Wright & Miller[, ] Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2662 (1973). Accordingly, logic
dictates that in those situations where an opposing party has
no notice, by pleadings or otherwise, regarding the claim
upon which relief is granted by means of Rule 54(c) and is
thereby denied an opportunity to have challenged or defended
against such a claim, the opposing party has suffered