United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
WILLIAM H. STEELE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (doc. 11). The Motion has been briefed and is now
ripe for disposition.
On June
20, 2017, plaintiff Roger Lynn Meadows, proceeding pro
se, filed a Complaint against a single defendant
identified as “Seafarers International Union the
S.I.U.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 3.)[1]In a cursory Complaint,
Meadows indicates that his claims herein arise from
“being told to remove asbestos from the ship Overseas
Alaska employed by Seafarers Maritime Overseas Co.”
(Id., ¶ 1.) No entity called “Seafarers
Maritime Overseas Co.” is joined as a defendant.
Attachments to the pleading elaborate on Meadows' claims.
He writes that he “was a member of the s.i.u.”
and served aboard “six oceangoing ships, ”
including the OVERSEAS ALASKA, where he “worked 800
days in the engine room” as a wiper. (Doc. 1-3, at 1.)
Meadows indicates that when the OVERSEAS ALASKA was en route
to the Port of Houston, Texas for inspection, he “was
told by the chief engineer … to remove the asbestos
from the engine room and throw it over the side, ”
which he did. (Id.) Meadows asserts that the
shipping company is at fault for forcing him to remove the
asbestos, as a result of which he contracted asbestosis.
(Id.)
The
attachments to the Complaint go on to explain that Meadows
was represented by a lawyer in maritime actions against 104
manufacturing/industrial/shipping corporations, and that his
lawyer successfully settled with ten of those entities.
(Id.) Meadows further states that several other
entities have filed for bankruptcy protection. (Id.)
The Complaint also includes, without elaboration or
explanation, copies of dozens of summonses from a 1996 case
in the Northern District of Ohio in which Meadows sued
numerous companies purportedly involved with the manufacture,
distribution or use of asbestos in some way. (Doc. 1-1.)
What
the Complaint does not specify is why Meadows is suing
Seafarers International Union, how Meadows contends he was
wronged by Seafarers International Union, or what Seafarers
International Union has to do with what Meadows characterizes
as an order by the chief engineer of the OVERSEAS ALASKA that
Meadows remove asbestos from the engine room, thereby causing
him to contract asbestosis. This omission is both obvious and
undeniable, even when the Court reviews Meadows' pleading
with the deference he is owed as a pro se litigant.
See, e.g., Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829
(11th Cir. 2007) (“we are to give liberal
construction to the pleadings of pro se
litigants”); Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys.”). Notwithstanding
Meadows' unrepresented status, he must abide by the
applicable procedural rules and present a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See, e.g., Goodykoontz v.
Diamond's Gentleman's Club, 187 F.Supp.3d 1332,
1334 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (“a pro se complaint,
like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be
granted by the court”) (citation omitted); Holmes
v. Escambia County Sheriff Dep't, 2015 WL 2095671,
*2 (S.D. Ala. May 4, 2015) (“Holmes' pro
se status does not excuse her from compliance with
procedural rules.”). And of course, a federal court
cannot serve as de facto counsel for a pro
se litigant or rewrite otherwise deficient pleadings to
pass Rule 12(b)(6) muster. See GJR Investments, Inc. v.
County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369
(11th Cir. 1998) (lenience afforded pro
se litigants does not allow court “to serve as
de facto counsel for a party … or to rewrite
an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action”).
Defendant,
Seafarers International Union, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes, and
Inland Waters, AFL-CIO (“SIU”), has now filed a
Motion to Dismiss keying on these principles. In particular,
SIU points out that Meadows' Complaint makes no
allegations against SIU, but is instead directed at events
from 1985 onboard the OVERSEAS ALASKA, a vessel that SIU
neither owns nor operates, at a time when Meadows was neither
employed by SIU nor supervised by SIU. According to
defendant, “any possible claim would be against his
employer, the owner and operator of that vessel, and/or the
manufacturer of the asbestos, none of which would include the
Defendant.” (Doc. 11, at 3.)
The
fundamental question raised by the Motion to Dismiss is why
Meadows is suing SIU for the events described in the
Complaint, none of which appear to have anything to do with
SIU. In response to the Motion, Meadows sheds no light on the
factual or legal basis of his claims against SIU. To be sure,
he alleges that when the chief engineer on the OVERSEAS
ALASKA directed him to remove the asbestos, Meadows was told
“they would put in a good word for me to advance with
the union.” (Doc. 13, at 1.) But that statement does
nothing to suggest that SIU was in any way involved with the
manufacture or installation of asbestos on the vessel, or had
any knowledge, awareness or role whatsoever in directing
Meadows to remove such asbestos. In short, nowhere in
Meadows' response (or any of his other filings in this
matter) does he identify any facts supporting a colorable
claim that SIU is or might be liable for the asbestosis
injuries of which he complains.
The
Motion to Dismiss alleges that the Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore, it is
properly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. To
withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny and satisfy Rule 8(a), a
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face, ” so as to
“nudge[] [its] claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)
(citation omitted). “This necessarily requires that a
plaintiff include factual allegations for each essential
element of his or her claim.” GeorgiaCarry.Org,
Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2012). Thus, minimum pleading standards “require[]
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As the Eleventh Circuit
has explained, Twombly / Iqbal principles
require that a complaint's allegations be “enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir.
2010) (citations omitted). “To survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed
factual allegations, … but must give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon
careful examination of the Complaint and Meadows'
response to the Motion to Dismiss, with due regard for the
deferential standard against which pro se pleadings
are evaluated, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not
satisfied Twombly / Iqbal pleading
requirements. Simply put, the Complaint comes nowhere close
to identifying a plausible claim for relief against SIU. In
his pleading, Meadows alleges that he contracted asbestosis
after an incident in which he was directed to remove asbestos
from a ship on which he was working. The Complaint is devoid
of allegations linking these events to SIU. There are no
facts alleged that, for example, SIU owned or operated the
OVERSEAS ALASKA at the time of the asbestos removal, that
Meadows was employed by SIU at the time of the asbestos
removal, or that SIU had any involvement in the chief
engineer of the OVERSEAS ALASKA's directive to Meadows to
remove asbestos from the engine room. Even after taking into
account Meadows' unrepresented status, the Court readily
finds that his filings fail to allege factual content
supporting a reasonable inference that SIU is liable to
Meadows on any cognizable legal theory. At most, the
Complaint alleges only that the complained-of events took
place while Meadows was a member of the SIU; however,
plaintiff has identified neither facts nor law that could
plausibly support a finding of liability against a trade
union based solely on the plaintiff's status as a union
member at the time he was exposed to asbestos. As noted
supra, the Court cannot formulate Meadows'
claims for him. It cannot rewrite or reimagine the Complaint
into something it is not, act as de facto counsel
for Meadows, or “fill in the blanks” to supply
factual support or a legal theory that he has never
identified. In its present form, the Complaint plainly fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore,
it is properly dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).
The
general rule applied to pro se plaintiffs in this
Circuit is that “[w]here a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at
least one chance to amend the complaint before the district
court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Bank v.
Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir.1991).[2] However, the Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal being ordered by this Court is
without prejudice, thereby removing it from the
purview of Bank. See Quinlan v. Personal
Transport Services, Co., 329 Fed.Appx. 246, 249
(11th Cir. June 5, 2009) (“we never have
stated that a district court sua sponte must allow a
plaintiff an opportunity to amend where it dismisses a
complaint without prejudice”); Bazrowx v.
Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1998)
(dismissal of pro se complaint without granting
leave to amend was proper where dismissal was without
prejudice); Zeigler v. Woodford, 2017 WL 4102743, *1
(M.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2017) (“this Court is not required
to sua sponte provide a plaintiff with an
opportunity to amend a complaint when the complaint is
dismissed without prejudice”);
Holmes, 2015 WL 2095671 at *3 (similar);
Lankster v. AT & T, 2013 WL 1389982, *4 (S.D.
Ala. Apr. 4, 2013) (similar).
For all
of the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(doc. 11) is granted, and this action is
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. A separate judgment will enter.
DONE
and ORDERED.
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