United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
SCOTT COOGLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Court has before it Petitioner Anthony Stutson's Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons stated below,
the motion is due to be denied.
August 1993, a superseding indictment was returned by the
grand jury for the Northern District of Alabama in which
Weatherly Stutson and her son, Anthony Stutson, were charged
with maintaining and directing a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. In addition,
both Weatherly and Anthony were charged in nine counts
alleging discrete violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841, or
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Mother and
son were also charged with nine separate violations of 21
U.S.C. § 843(b), using communications devices and the
U.S. mails to facilitate drug transactions. In addition,
sixteen defendants, including Weatherly and Anthony, were
indicted for participation in a conspiracy to distribute and
transport large quantities of illegal controlled substances
from California to Alabama.
a two-month trial, Anthony and Weatherly were convicted of
maintaining a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy, and
substantive counts. Anthony Stutson was convicted of each of
the nine counts of possession with the intent to distribute
cocaine and eight counts of using communication devices to
facilitate drug transactions. Both Weatherly and Anthony were
also convicted of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956. All thirteen of the defendants who went to
trial, many of whom were family members, were convicted of
criminal offenses including seven who were convicted only in
the conspiracy count. Judgment was entered on July 5, 1994.
unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed Anthony Stutson's continuing criminal enterprise
conviction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848 but vacated the
21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy conviction and a conviction
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The appellate court affirmed the
convictions for the nine substantive distribution offenses
and the seven convictions for violations of 21 U.S.C. §
843(b) and the money laundering count.
filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on February
2, 1999. See Stutson v. United States,
2:99-cv-8005-LSC-PWG. This Court denied the motion on the
merits on March 30, 2005. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals denied Stutson's motion for a certificate of
appealability on July 26, 2005.
filed the instant § 2255 motion on July 25, 2017.
Stutson's second motion filed pursuant to § 2255. It
is due to be denied for lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§2255(h) requires Stutson to follow the procedures of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), which states, “Before a
second or successive application permitted by this section is
filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider the application.” Since
Stutson has not received authorization from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to file this successive motion, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. See United
States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Without authorization, the district court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a second or successive
this were Stutson's first 2255 motion, it would fail on
the merits. Stutson seeks to apply the “Holloway
Doctrine” pursuant to United States v.
Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), to reduce
his sentence as disproportionately severe. Stutson is not the
first defendant to seek relief under the so-called
“Holloway Doctrine, ” which is not a doctrine but
a single case. Mr. Holloway received a stacked sentence of
691 months of imprisonment in the Eastern District of New
York. In the Holloway case, finding no other
available avenue of relief, the district judge issued an
order requesting that the United States Attorney exercise her
discretion to vacate two or more of convictions under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). The request was initially declined, and
the district judge asked for reconsideration. After reviewing
Mr. Holloway's file, the government stated as follows:
In terms of how to proceed, we would propose to withdraw our
opposition to the pending Rule 60(b) motion, and also to
state on the record that we wouldn't oppose the granting
of the underlying § 2255 motion for the purpose of
vesting the court with authority to vacate two of the §
924(c) convictions, and to proceed to resentence, all of that
without taking a position on the merits of either the Rule 60
motion or the habeas petition.
68 F.Supp.3d at 315. Mr. Holloway would not have been
eligible for relief without the government's agreement,
and the government has not agreed to any such reduction in
this case. Further, Holloway is not binding on the
undersigned, and therefore the motion is also denied on this