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Randle v. Dynamic Security, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

October 13, 2017

LALA E. RANDLE, Plaintiff,
v.
DYNAMIC SECURITY, INC., Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Lala E. Randle, against the Defendant, Dynamic Security, Inc. (“Dynamic”), her former employer. (Doc. 13). The Amended Complaint sets out the following counts: “Sexual Harassment/Hostile [Work] Environment, ” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) (Count One); “Sex Discrimination” in violation of Title VII (Count Two); and “Retaliation” in violation of Title VII (Count Three).

         The case comes before the Court on the Defendant's Partial Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”). (Doc. 16). The Defendant attacks only Count Two. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be GRANTED and Count Two will be DISMISSED with prejudice.

         I. STANDARD

         Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). However, to survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Twombly”).

         A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (“Iqbal”). That is, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation and footnote omitted). Pleadings that contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels or conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557 (citation omitted).

         Once a claim has been stated adequately, however, “it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563 (citation omitted). Further, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)).

         II. RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT[1]

         The Amended Complaint, in pertinent part, sets out the following allegations:

8. Plaintiff worked for Dynamic Security from August 19, 2002, until January 6, 2015. Plaintiff's last position at Dynamic was Regional Manager of Security over portions of Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.
25. On November 18, 2014, and again on November 19, 2014, plaintiff's supervisor Mr. Donnelly demanded that the plaintiff spend the night with him during a business trip to Mobile and Montgomery.
26. On or about November 20, 2015, plaintiff complained to Regional Vice President Jim Banta that Jim Donnelly was harassing her, and Banta told her to take that up with Jim Donnelly herself.
27. On or about January 5, 2015, plaintiff complained to HR Coordinator Sherry Spires about the sexual harassment by Donnelly, and the next day she was fired.
28. Plaintiff is a member of a group protected by Title VII (female).
29. She was qualified for the position she held with Defendant.
30. Plaintiff suffered an adverse effect on her employment (unwanted sexual advances and termination).
31. Plaintiff suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules (males not subjected to sexual advances or terminated ...

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