Ex parte Ampro Products, Inc.
Ampro Products, Inc. In re: Toni Colvin
Circuit Court, CV-15-900077
Products, Inc. ("the employer"), has petitioned
this court for a writ of mandamus directed to the Pickens
Circuit Court ("the trial court") in a workers'
compensation case filed by Toni Colvin ("the
employee"). We grant the petition in part and deny it in
September 18, 2015, the employee filed a complaint seeking
workers' compensation benefits from the employer. On
April 28, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the issue
of compensability. At the close of the hearing, the employee
submitted a list of expenses that he had incurred in proving
that his injury was compensable and requested reimbursement
for those expenses. On May 30, 2017, the employer filed a
motion requesting, among other things, that the trial court
dismiss the employee's complaint, pursuant to Rule 41(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P., as a sanction for his having allegedly
9, 2017, the trial court entered an order finding that the
employee had suffered a compensable injury and taxing the
expenses requested by the employee as costs against the
employer. On June 22, 2017, the employer filed a
motion to reconsider the taxing of costs; the employee filed
a response to that motion on June 29, 2017. The trial court
denied the motion to reconsider the taxing of costs on June
29, 2017. On July 21, 2017, the employer filed its petition
for a writ of mandamus with this court.
petition, the employer first argues that the trial court
erred in declining to dismiss the employee's complaint as
a sanction for the employee's alleged perjury.
"As this Court has consistently held, the writ of
mandamus is a "'"drastic and extraordinary writ
that will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative
duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal
to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4)
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."'
"Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628
So.2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993))."
parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 20-21
"'It is well settled that the decision whether to
enter a Rule 41(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P., ] dismissal is within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a dismissal
will be reversed only if the trial court exceeded its
discretion. Atkins v. Shirley, 561 So.2d 1075, 1077
(Ala. 1990); Riddlesprigger v. Ervin, 519 So.2d 486,
487 (Ala. 1987); State ex rel. S.M. v. A.H., 832
So.2d 79, 80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); and Coulter v.
Stewart, 726 So.2d 726, 728 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
However, because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic
sanction, it should be applied only in extreme situations.
Smith v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 365 So.2d 659,
661 (Ala. 1978). Therefore, this court will carefully
scrutinize orders dismissing an action with prejudice and
occasionally will find it necessary to set them aside.
Id. In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of
an action, we must ...