United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
JUDY P. BROWN Plaintiff,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,  Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
F. MOORER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
administrative denial of her application for Supplemental
Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, Judy P. Brown ("Brown" or
"Plaintiff) received a requested hearing before an
administrative law judge ("ALJ") who rendered an
unfavorable decision. When the Appeals Council rejected
review, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security
("Commissioner"). See Chester v. Bowen,
792F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Judicial review proceeds
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 42 U.S.C. §
1383(c)(3), and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and for reasons
herein explained, the Court AFFIRMS the
Commissioner's decision denying supplemental security
Nature of the Case
seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security
Administration's decision denying her application for
supplemental security income benefits. United States district
courts may conduct limited review of such decisions to
determine whether they comply with applicable law and are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405
(2006). The court may affirm, reverse and remand with
instructions, or reverse and render a judgment. Id.
Standard of Review
review of the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is
narrowly circumscribed. In review of a social security case,
the court will use the substantial evidence standard to
affirm the Commissioner's decision if substantial
evidence exists to support the decision. Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 111 F.3d 780, 781 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing
Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 631 F.3d 1176,
1178 (11th Cir. 2011)). The court is limited in its review,
therefore the court is "preclude[d] [from] deciding the
facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing
the evidence." Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d
1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Bloodsworth v.
Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1986)). This
court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive
"if it is supported by substantial evidence and the
correct legal standards were applied." Kelley v.
Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999); see
also Kosloff v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 581 Fed.Appx.
811, 811 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Kelley); Moreno v.
Astrue, 366 Fed.Appx. 23, 26-27 (11th Cir. 2010)
("failure to apply the correct law or to provide the
reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining
that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates
reversal.") (Citation omitted).
evidence is more than a scintilla - i.e., the evidence must
do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a
fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Crawford v.
Comm'r of Soc Sec, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004)); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91
S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). If the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the court
would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and
even if the court finds that the evidence preponderates
against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v.
Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991);
see also Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 802 F.3d
1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) ("even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner's
findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported
by substantial evidence.") (Citation omitted). The
district court must view the record as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the
decision. Foote v. Chafer, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citing Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,
131 (11th Cir. 1986)).
district court will reverse a Commissioner's decision on
plenary review if the decision applies incorrect law, or if
the decision fails to provide the district court with
sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner
properly applied the law. Keeton v. Department of Health
and Human Services, 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal citations omitted). There is no presumption that
the Secretary's conclusions of law are valid. Id.;
Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991).
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Social Security Act's general disability insurance
benefits program ("DIB") provides income to
individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature
retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled,
regardless of indigence. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a).
The Social Security Act's Supplemental Security Income
("SSI") is a separate and distinct program. SSI is
a general public assistance measure providing an additional
resource to the aged, blind, and disabled to assure that
their income does not fall below the poverty
line. Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of
indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§
1382(a), 1382c(a)(3). However, despite the fact they are
separate programs, the law and regulations governing a claim
for DIB and a claim for SSI are identical; therefore, claims
for DIB and SSI are treated identically for the purpose of
determining whether a claimant is disabled. Patterson v.
Bowen, 799 F.2d 1455, 1456 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1986).
Applicants under DIB and SSI must provide
"disability" within the meaning of the Social
Security Act which defines disability in virtually identical
language for both programs. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(G); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). A person is entitled to
disability benefits when the person is unable to
Engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A
"physical or mental impairment" is one resulting
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Commissioner utilizes a five-step, burden-shifting analysis
to determine when claimants are disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520; Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); O'Neal v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec, 614 Fed.Appx. 456 (11th Cir. June 10, 2015).
The ALJ determines:
(1) Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
(2) Whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments;
(3) Whether the impairment meets or exceeds one of the
impairments in the listings;
(4) Whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and
(5) Whether the claimant can perform other work in the
national economy. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178;
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
2001). When a claimant is found disabled - or not - at an
early step, the remaining steps are not considered.
McDanielv. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir.
1986). This procedure is a fair and just way for determining
disability applications in conformity with the Social
Security Act. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
153, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2297, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (citing
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461, 103 S.Ct.
1952, 1954, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983)) (The use of the sequential
evaluation process "contribute[s] to the uniformity and
efficiency of disability determinations").
burden of proof rests on the claimant through Step 4. See
Ostborg v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec,610 Fed.Appx. 907,
915 (11th Cir. 2015); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39.
Aprimafacie case of qualifying disability exists
when a claimant carries the Step 1 through Step 4 burden.
Only at the fifth step does the burden shift to the
Commissioner, who must then ...