Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Sturdivant v. Jones

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

September 14, 2017

TOMMY STURDIVANT, #148248, Petitioner,
v.
KARLA JONES, Respondent.

          ORDER

          KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent's Answer. (Docs. 1, 7, 9). Petitioner Tommy Sturdivant, an Alabama prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Docs. 1, 7). Through the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Respondent Karla Jones, has timely filed an Answer to the petition. (Doc. 13). Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72.2(b), the petition has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge who, under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), is authorized to require responses, issue orders to show cause and any other orders necessary to develop a complete record, and to prepare a report and recommendation to the District Judge as to appropriate disposition of the petition, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 8(b) and 10 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.

         Upon consideration of the Respondent's Answer, Sturdivant is hereby permitted to submit a reply to the Answer showing cause why his habeas petition should not be dismissed for the reasons stated in the Answer. The reply must be filed with the Court no later than Thursday, October 5, 2017. See Rule 5(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The petitioner may submit a reply to the respondent's answer … within a time fixed by the judge.”).

         As detailed in the Answer, it appears Sturdivant's conviction became final on June 11, 2017 (Doc. 4 at 15-18), making his habeas petition untimely. Because Sturdivant's habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is subject to application of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”). E.g., Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1625 (2013). Among other things, AEDPA imposes the following time limit for bringing habeas petitions:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

         Because Sturdivant is proceeding pro se in this action, he is advised that certain equitable exceptions may excuse an untimely habeas claim. First,

the district court may still review an untimely petition filed by a petitioner entitled to equitable tolling. As the Supreme Court has explained, the time period specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar, and Section 2244 does not bar the application of equitable tolling in an appropriate case. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).
The Supreme Court []affirmed, however, that “a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (internal quotation marks omitted); Sandvik v. United States,177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that equitable tolling is available “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence”). “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence, ' not ‘maximum feasible diligence.' ” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As for the “extraordinary circumstance” ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.