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Fuente v. Merrill

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

August 30, 2017

ROQUE “ROCKY” DE LA FUENTE and ADANYS CLERCH, Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN H. MERRILL, Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          W. KEITH WATKINS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant John H. Merrill. (Doc. # 25.) Because Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 7) fails to state a cognizable claim, the motion is due to be granted and this action dismissed with prejudice.

         I. JURISIDCTION AND VENUE

         The court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard articulated by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 provides that the complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2012). The court need not, however, accept mere legal conclusions as true. Id. at 1325.

         To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

         III. DISCUSSION

         The court already has written at length to the background of this case and the validity of Plaintiffs' claims. De La Fuente v. Merrill, 214 F.Supp.3d 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2016); (Doc. # 27). The facts and challenged statutory framework will not be rehashed.

         Similarly, the court will not repeat its discussion of the merits of Plaintiffs' challenge. De La Fuente, 214 F.Supp.3d at 1252-1259; (Doc. # 27 at 19-33).[1] In the prior opinion, the court considered Mr. De La Fuente's arguments and found that Plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on their claims under the Qualifications Clause, First Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause. Just as this analytical framework demonstrated that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, it establishes that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim to relief.[2] Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is due to be granted. See Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016) (articulating standard governing 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss).

         Plaintiffs' new arguments in their opposition brief do not change this result. (See Doc. # 32.) First, Plaintiffs urge that the factual merits of their claims are the topic of Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion, but that is not the case. While it is true that a motion to dismiss does not test the truth of a plaintiff's factual claims, Dusek, 832 F.3d at 1246, Plaintiffs miss the substance of the motion, as well as the inherent power of the court to dismiss an action. Dismissal is proper “when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). Dismissal is the destination of Plaintiffs' legal arguments here, as amply explained in the prior opinion.

         Second, Plaintiffs point to Bergland v. Harris for the proposition that the court cannot enter judgment for Defendant absent some proof of his asserted justifications for the sore loser law. See 767 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1985). But, to the extent Bergland requires “‘a particularized showing' of common State interests like ‘voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access, '” it was overruled by the Supreme Court in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986). De La Fuente, 214 F.Supp.3d at 1257 (quoting Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95); (Doc. # 27 at 29-30). These are the sort of interests claimed by Secretary Merrill, and accordingly Alabama's “reasonable restriction[ ] on ballot access” will stand even without proof that voters are already confused, parties already splintered, or election integrity already compromised. See Munro, 479 U.S. at 195.

         Third, and on a related point, Plaintiffs argue that Alabama's reduced interest in national elections undermines its application of the sore loser law to the Presidential election. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983) (recognizing the lesser state interest “in regulating Presidential elections” as opposed to “state-wide or local elections”). Yet the challenged statute is the sort of “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction[ ], ” which may be upheld on the basis of “a State's ‘important regulatory interests.'” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).

         The court addressed these “important regulatory interests” in its prior opinion. De La Fuente, 214 F.Supp.3d at 1256-57; (Doc. # 27 at 27-30). To the extent that the State's concerns of political stability lose their heft in the national arena, Alabama's interest in attracting national political parties becomes even weightier in a Presidential election. Moreover, the few courts to have confronted a state's application of a sore loser law to keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot have recognized the state's strong interest in safeguarding honest elections and in the integrity of its ballot-access procedures, further undermining Plaintiffs' ...


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