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MacLaren v. Berryhill

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Jasper Division

August 14, 2017

ROBERT MACLAREN, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

          L. Scott Coogler United States District Judge.

         I. Introduction

         The plaintiff, Robert Maclaren, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Mr. Maclaren timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

         Mr. Maclaren was forty-three years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ's”) decision, and he has an eleventh grade education and a GED. (Tr. at 50.) His past work experiences include employment as chiller operator, poultry hanger, metal hanger in the manufactured home industry, over the road truck driver, window installer in the manufactured building industry, cabinet and trim installer in manufactured buildings, electronics technician in the military, table saw operator, pizza baker, and manager trainee in a restaurant. (Tr. at 51-53.) Mr. Maclaren claims that he became disabled on August 16, 2013, due to neck and back injury and arthritis. (Tr. at 54-55.)

         The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). See Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to the next step.

         The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of the plaintiff's medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not disabled).

         Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

         If the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work. See Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

         The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

         Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. Maclaren meets the non-disability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was insured through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 31.) He further determined that Mr. Maclaren has not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset of his disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with chronic cervicalgia; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with chronic lumbago; and degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, the judge found that these impairments neither meet nor are the medical equivalent of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 32.) The ALJ then determined that the plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work with significant postural and environmental restrictions; he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, or crouch; he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; however, he is precluded from climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he is precluded from doing work that involves crawling, unprotected heights, and concentrated exposure to extreme heat and cold; he is limited to only occasional reaching/lifting with his non-dominant right upper extremity. (Tr. at 33.)

         According to the ALJ, Mr. Maclaren is unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (Tr. at 36.) He is a “younger individual” and “has at least a high school education” as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Id.) Because Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of sedentary work, the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”) and used Medical-Vocational Rule 201.28 as a guideline for finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he is capable of performing, such as a spotter table worker, a check weigher, and a non-production assembler. (Tr. at 37.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff “was not under a ‘disability, ' as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision.” (Id.)

         II. Standard of Review

         This Court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App'x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

         Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates ...


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