Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Sanders v. Birmingham Jefferson County Transit Authority

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

June 28, 2017




         I. Background

         This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 7). In its Motion (Doc. # 7), Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint is due to be dismissed. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is due to be denied.

         II. Factual Background

         Prior to her termination, Plaintiff worked as a driver and team leader for Birmingham Jefferson County Transit Authority. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 7, 8). She was terminated from her employment based on her conduct during an incident that occurred involving a bus passenger. (Doc. # 24 at ¶ 24). Specifically, she alleges that when a passenger who had been repeatedly belligerent on previous occasions attempted to board the bus she was driving, she denied him access by closing the bus door. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17). The customer then kicked and pushed his way through the bus door and eventually fell down. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20).

         Defendant terminated Plaintiff after an investigation into this incident. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges that she was told that she had been terminated because she “used extremely vulgar language” during the incident and because she closed the door. (Id.). She further alleges that other male co-workers had been “rude to customers and/or used profane language and not been terminated.” (Id. at ¶ 31).

         III. Standard of Review

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Still, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).

         To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement, '” the complaint must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Supreme Court has identified “two working principles” for a district court to use in applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions when they are “couched as . . . factual allegation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679.

         Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under prong one, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are well-pleaded and assume their veracity; and under prong two, the court must proceed to determine the claim's plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. Id.

         Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .'” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Plaintiff is not required to prove directly that gender was the reason for the employer's challenged decision; instead, Plaintiff may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., id.; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) (“Because Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise, we devised a framework that would allow both plaintiffs and the courts to deal effectively with employment discrimination revealed only through circumstantial evidence.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

         To prevail on a claim for discrimination under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

         IV. Analysis

         In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that it treated her differently than similarly situated male employees. (Doc. # 7-1 at p. 4). Defendant attaches Plaintiff's termination letter to its motion (see Doc. # 7-2) and argues that the letter establishes that Plaintiff was not merely terminated for vulgar language, but instead was terminated for “Gross Negligence in the operation of a bus.” (Id. at p. 2). Because Plaintiff has not alleged that any of her male counterparts committed gross negligence in the operation of a bus without being terminated, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to plead the existence of a similarly situated ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.