United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
CHARLES J. GREENE, Plaintiff,
ALABAMA DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, d/b/a CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE CAPEL, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
December 2, 2015, Charles J. Greene
(“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed
a complaint (Doc. 1) alleging, in four separate claims, that
the Alabama Department of Public Health
(“Defendant”) violated his rights under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq. Presently before the court is
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) and
supporting memorandum (Doc. 43). Plaintiff did not file a
response to the motion. For the reasons that follow, the court
finds that Defendant's motion is due to be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
reviewing court shall grant a motion for “summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting
of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “An issue of fact
is ‘genuine' if the record as a whole could lead a
reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An
issue is ‘material' if it might affect the outcome
of the case under the governing law.” Redwing
Vehicleriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489,
1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment
“always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, ' which it
believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Id. at 323. The movant can
meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no
dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving
party has failed to present evidence in support of some
element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of
proof. Id. at 322-23.
the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party
must “go beyond the pleadings and by his own
affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, ' designate
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.'” Id. at 324. In doing so, and
to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The
parties must support their assertions “that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by
“showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).
nonmovant “fails to properly address another
party's assertion of fact” as required by Rule
56(c), then the court may “consider the fact undisputed
for purposes of the motion” and “grant summary
judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including
the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is
entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) & (3).
determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the
court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).
Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable
inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's
favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However,
“mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations
are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[a] mere
‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing
party's position will not suffice; there must be enough
of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that
party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577
(11th Cir. 1990); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50 (“If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party
relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.”) (internal
STATEMENT OF FACTS
to the scheduling order, see Doc. 22 at § 2.5,
the parties have jointly agreed that the following facts are
uncontested for purposes of Defendant's motion for
a male, began his employment with ADPH in April 2003 as an
Administrative Support Assistant II in the Children's
Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”). Greene was
promoted to a Health Insurance Assistant (“HIA”)
in October 2005.
submitted his letter of resignation in August 2014, to be
effective August 16, 2014. Greene left ADPH to accept a
higher paying job (promotion) at the Alabama Department of
Revenue. Greene left his employment with ADPH in good
job duties were listed on his official Position
Classification Questionnaire document at ADPH, and approved
by State Personnel.
October 3, 2013, Greene filed a charge of discrimination (no.
420-2014-00079) with the EEOC complaining that he was
discriminated against based on gender when he received his
2013 Performance Appraisal score.
19, 2014, Greene field another EEOC charge of discrimination
(no. 420-2014-02285) complaining of discrimination based on
gender and retaliation when he received a counseling for
calling in sick on Saturdays.
October 10, 2014, Greene filed another EEOC charge of
discrimination (no. 420-2015-00088) complaining of
discrimination based on gender and retaliation when he
received his 2014 performance appraisal score.
charge was filed after Greene voluntarily resigned from ADPH
in August 2014 (ADPH did not terminate Greene's
employment; he left ADPH in good standing).
EEOC issued Greene his Right to Sue letters on September 1,
2015, for the following charges: 420-2014-00079;
420-2014-01498; and 420-2015-00088. The EEOC issued Greene
a Right to Sue letter on February 11, 2016, for charge
filed this lawsuit on December 2, 2015.