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Greene v. Alabama Department of Public Health

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

February 3, 2017

CHARLES J. GREENE, Plaintiff,
v.
ALABAMA DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, d/b/a CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM, Defendant.

          RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          WALLACE CAPEL, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         On December 2, 2015, Charles J. Greene (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint (Doc. 1) alleging, in four separate claims, that the Alabama Department of Public Health (“Defendant”) violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) and supporting memorandum (Doc. 43). Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion.[1] For the reasons that follow, the court finds that Defendant's motion is due to be granted.

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall grant a motion for “summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is ‘material' if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Vehicleriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

         Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, ' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23.

         Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The parties must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).

         If the nonmovant “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact” as required by Rule 56(c), then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) & (3).

         In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (“If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”) (internal citations omitted).

         III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

         A. Uncontested Facts

         Pursuant to the scheduling order, see Doc. 22 at § 2.5, the parties have jointly agreed that the following facts are uncontested for purposes of Defendant's motion for summary judgment:

         Greene, a male, began his employment with ADPH in April 2003 as an Administrative Support Assistant II in the Children's Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”). Greene was promoted to a Health Insurance Assistant (“HIA”) in October 2005.

         Greene submitted his letter of resignation in August 2014, to be effective August 16, 2014. Greene left ADPH to accept a higher paying job (promotion) at the Alabama Department of Revenue. Greene left his employment with ADPH in good standing.

         Greene's job duties were listed on his official Position Classification Questionnaire document at ADPH, and approved by State Personnel.

         On October 3, 2013, Greene filed a charge of discrimination (no. 420-2014-00079) with the EEOC complaining that he was discriminated against based on gender when he received his 2013 Performance Appraisal score.

         On June 19, 2014, Greene field another EEOC charge of discrimination (no. 420-2014-02285) complaining of discrimination based on gender and retaliation when he received a counseling for calling in sick on Saturdays.

         On October 10, 2014, Greene filed another EEOC charge of discrimination (no. 420-2015-00088) complaining of discrimination based on gender and retaliation when he received his 2014 performance appraisal score.

         This charge was filed after Greene voluntarily resigned from ADPH in August 2014 (ADPH did not terminate Greene's employment; he left ADPH in good standing).

         The EEOC issued Greene his Right to Sue letters on September 1, 2015, for the following charges: 420-2014-00079; 420-2014-01498;[2] and 420-2015-00088. The EEOC issued Greene a Right to Sue letter on February 11, 2016, for charge 420-2014-02285.

         Greene filed this lawsuit on December 2, 2015.

         B. ...


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