from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cr-00045-CEM-KRS-1.
ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit
Scheels pleaded guilty to one count of production of child
pornography and one count of receipt of child pornography.
The district court sentenced him to a total of 600 months in
prison. Scheels contends that the district court erred in
calculating his guideline range by imposing a four-level
enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(4) of the United States
review the district court's legal interpretations of the
Sentencing Guidelines under a de novo standard of
review . . . ." United States v. Zaldivar, 615
F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010). Section 2G2.1(b)(4)
requires the imposition of a four-level enhancement where a
defendant's "offense involved material that portrays
sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of
violence." Scheels does not argue that the pornography
he produced does not depict "sadistic or masochistic
conduct." Indeed, he admits that it contains, among
other things, images involving whipping and bondage. But
Scheels argues that, notwithstanding that content, the §
2G2.1(b)(4) enhancement should not apply to him, because the
"sadistic or masochistic conduct" in his
pornography was directed at him, not the child victim. We
plain language of § 2G2.1(b)(4) requires only that an
offense "involve[ ] . . . sadistic or
masochistic conduct, " not that that conduct be directed
at the victim. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4) (emphasis added).
"The language of the Sentencing Guidelines, like the
language of a statute, must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning . . . ." United States v. Fulford, 662
F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted). The ordinary meaning of involve, when
used as a verb, is "[t]o have as a necessary feature or
consequence; entail, " Involve, The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
(5th ed. 2016), or "to have within or as a part of
itself, " Involve, Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2009). Moreover, under
the guidelines, a defendant's "offense"
includes "all acts and omissions committed, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . ."
U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(H), 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)
(emphasis added). Here, a part of the production offense to
which Scheels pleaded guilty was inducing or commanding a
minor to participate in sadistic or masochistic conduct
during the course of sexual activity. As a result, his offense
"involved" such conduct, regardless of whether the
conduct was directed at him or the minor victim.
acknowledging that there are no cases directly on point,
Scheels argues that our past decisions and the decisions of
our sister circuits cast doubt on our interpretation of
§ 2G2.1(b)(4). He cites a number of cases, like
United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted), which contain
statements like: "[A] photograph is sadistic within the
meaning of Section 2G2.2(b)(3) when it depicts the subjection of a young
child to a sexual act that would have to be painful."
But those cases merely stand for the proposition that
material depicting sadistic or masochistic conduct directed
towards the child is sufficient to warrant the
application of a § 2G2.1(b)(4) enhancement, not that it
is necessary. Indeed, because the cases Scheels
cites concerned material that contained sadistic or
masochistic conduct directed at a minor, any statement by
those courts suggesting that the images would not have
justified applying the enhancement if they had shown the
minor participating in sadistic or masochistic conduct
directed towards the defendant is merely dicta. Pretka v.
Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 762 (11th Cir.
2010) ("Statements in an opinion that are not fitted to
the facts, or that extend further than the facts of that
case, or that are not necessary to the decision of an appeal
given the facts and circumstances of the case are dicta. We
are not required to follow dicta in our prior decisions. Nor
for that matter is anyone else.") (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Given a choice between what is, at best,
dicta from this and other circuits and the obvious meaning of
the plain text of the guidelines, we choose the guidelines.
district court did not error by applying a four-level
enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(4) when calculating
Scheels' guideline range.
 Based on the last presentence report
prepared in this case, it appears that Scheels was sentenced
based on the 2014 version of the guidelines even though, by
the time Scheels was sentenced, the 2015 version of the
guidelines had become effective. But that has no impact on
this appeal because there was no change to § 2G2.1(b)(4)
of the guidelines between the 2014 and 2015 versions of the
guidelines and Scheels does not challenge any other aspects
of the district court's guidelines calculation. That
said, when we cite to the guidelines in this opinion, we are
referring to the 2015 version.
 As directed by U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4,
Scheels' total offense level was calculated based on the
production offense because - of the charges to which Scheels
pleaded guilty - it had the highest offense level.
 Although Hall concerned §
2G2.2(b)(3), which was subsequently renumbered
§2G2.2(b)(4), not § 2G2.1(b)(4), the language of
the provisions is identical. Compare U.S.S.G. §
2G2.1(b)(4) (2015), with id. § 2G2.2(b)(4)