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Carey v. Mason

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

January 3, 2017

CARLOS CAREY, AIS #245045, Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN RENE MASON, et al, Defendants.

          RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

          WALLACE CAPEL, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an amended complaint and amendment thereto filed by Carlos Carey (“Carey”), a state inmate and frequent litigant before this court. In the instant complaint, Carey challenges actions which occurred at the Bullock Correctional Facility in November and December of 2013. Amendment to the Compl. - Doc. No. 10 at 2. Specifically, Carey alleges that the defendants extended his segregation time, removed his mattress from his segregation cell, advised other inmates he was a snitch, attempted to bribe other inmates to cause him harm and threatened him with violence in retaliation for his voicing complaints to prison officials and filing/refusing to dismiss a prior lawsuit in this court. Id. at 3-4. Carey names Rene Mason, Clatys Jenkins, Dominic Whitley, Cedric King, Clevon Randolph, Kenneth Jones and Sandra Giles, all correctional officials employed at Bullock at the time relevant to the complaint, as defendants. Carey seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

         The defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing Carey's claims for relief. In these documents, the defendants deny they retaliated against Carey for exercising his First Amendment rights.

         Upon receipt of the defendants' special report, the court issued an order directing Carey to file a response to the reports, including affidavits, sworn statements or other evidentiary materials. Order of March 20, 2014 - Doc. No. 24 at 2. This order specifically cautioned Carey that unless “sufficient legal cause” is shown within fifteen days of entry of this order “why such action should not be undertaken, . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for his filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law.” Id. at 2-3. Carey filed a sworn response (Doc. No. 42) and affidavits (Doc. No. 43-1 at 1-2) in opposition to the defendants' report.

         Pursuant to the order entered on March 20, 2014, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the amended complaint, the amendment to the complaint and the responses to the defendants' report filed by Carey, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

         II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

         “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).[1] The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324.

         The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff. Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ” demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts
must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242');">477 U.S. 242 [ ] (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff's “conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment.”); Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. -- and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).

         For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

         Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.

         The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After such review, the court finds that Carey has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

         III. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

         To the extent Carey sues the defendants in their official capacities, they are immune from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama's immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

         In light of the foregoing and under the facts of this case, the defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989).

         IV. RELEVANT FACTS

         On August 22, 2013, defendant Whitley charged Carey with five (5) disciplinary infractions for various violations of administrative rules. Defs.' Exh. H - Doc. No. 23-8 at 11-63. The charges lodged against Carey included (i) failure to obey a direct order due to his failure to leave defendant Mason's office when ordered to do so, (ii) assault on a person associated with ADOC for spitting on defendant Whitley, (iii) insubordination for cursing defendant Mason, (iv) intentionally creating a security, safety or health hazard by spitting on defendant Whitley's shirt, and (v) disorderly conduct when he referred to defendant Whitley in a racially derogatory manner. Id. After receiving a disciplinary hearing on each charge, the hearing officer, defendant Randolph, found Carey guilty of the charged offenses. The punishment imposed upon Carey for his violations of the rules included a cumulative total of 180 days of confinement in disciplinary segregation. In addition, it is standard operating procedure to remove mattresses from the cells of inmates confined in disciplinary segregation Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. See Defs.' Exh. D - Doc. No. 23-4 at 4-5.

         V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

         A. Retaliation

         Carey alleges that in November and December of 2013 the defendants verbally threatened and harassed him for filing a previous lawsuit and complaining of actions by correctional officers. Specifically, Carey alleges that Warden Mason responded to his complaints against the officers by telling his cell mate “to watch what you say around [Carey] because he will tell me everything I need to know” in ear shot of other inmates which led to problems with his cell mate and other inmates. Amendment to the Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 10 at 2-3. Carey further alleges that officers King, Whitley and Randolph threatened him with violence and continually tried to bribe other inmates to harm him. Id. at 3. Finally, Carey contends that when he advised Capt. Jenkins of the behavior of the officers, Jenkins advised Carey “he was a member of the Blood gang” and threatened Carey with reprisal by members of this gang. Id. Carey further alleges that Jenkins retaliated against him by increasing his segregation “time from 45 days to 6 months and then took my mattress so that I am sleeping on the floor. My mattress now is taken every day.” Id.

         The defendants adamantly deny taking any action against Carey in retaliation for filing a lawsuit or due to his complaints regarding the actions of correctional officials. The affidavits and evidentiary materials submitted by the defendants, including documents contained in Carey's institutional ...


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