United States District Court, Southern District of Alabama, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BERT W. MILLING, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Pending before the Court is Evans’s Attorney’s Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter EAJA), with supporting Documentation (Doc. 23), and Defendant’s Response (Doc. 24). After considering the pertinent pleadings, it is ORDERED that the Motion be GRANTED and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA attorney’s fee in the amount of $2, 066.42 and $492.96 in court costs and litigation expenses.
Plaintiff filed this action on June 30, 2014 (Doc. 1). On March 12, 2015, the undersigned Judge entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, reversing the decision of the Commissioner, and remanding this action for further proceedings (Doc. 21). Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant (Doc. 22).
On April 10, 2015, William T. Coplin, Jr., Plaintiff’s Attorney, filed an EAJA Fee Application requesting a fee of $2, 066.42, computed at an hourly rate of $189.58 for 10.9 hours spent in this Court; additionally, Coplin requests $492.96 in court costs and expenses (Doc. 23). Defendant, in her Response filed on April 20, stated that she had no objection to the requested fee, noting that payment should be made to Plaintiff rather than to her Attorney (Doc. 24).
The EAJA requires a court to
award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for judicial review of Agency action, brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA further requires that a prevailing party file an application for attorney’s fees within thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The court’s judgment is final sixty days after it is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
As set out above, three statutory conditions must be satisfied before EAJA fees may be awarded. See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must file a fee application within the thirty-day period; also, the claimant must be a prevailing party. Finally, the Government’s position must not be substantially justified.
Defendant apparently concedes all three EAJA requirements (see Doc. 24). The Court finds that they have been met.
Having found the prerequisites satisfied, the Court will discuss the fee to be awarded. EAJA is a fee-shifting statute. The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985 (EAJA) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (§ 1988)). In describing this lodestar method of calculation, the United States Supreme Court stated:
This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services. The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly. The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not “reasonably expended.” . . . Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission. In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).
After examining Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Application, and supporting documentation, and considering the reasonableness of the hours claimed, the Court finds that the 10.9 hours ...