April 24, 2015
Ex parte Amee Kozlovski, M.D.
Altapointe Health Systems, Inc., and Amee Kozlovski, M.D. In re: David Shamlin, as administrator of the estate of Jeffery Brown, deceased
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-12-902874).
Petitioner: Thomas O. Gaillard III of Satterwhite, Druhan,
Gaillard & Tyler, LLC, Mobile; and Luther Strange, atty.
gen., and Thomas B. Klinner, gen. counsel and asst. atty.
gen., and Joseph " Jody" G. Stewart, Jr., asst.
atty. gen., Alabama Department of Mental Health.
Respondent: John R. Spencer, Mobile; and C.S. Chiepalich,
Justice. Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, Wise, and
Bryan, JJ., concur. Parker, J., dissents.
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Kozlovski, M.D., petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Mobile Circuit Court to enter a summary
judgment in her favor in a wrongful-death action brought
against her by David Shamlin, as administrator of the estate
of Jeffery Brown, deceased. We grant the petition and
issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
November 2011, following a physical attack on his father,
David Brown, Jeffery Brown was involuntarily committed by the
Mobile Probate Court to Searcy Hospital, a long-term-care
facility for mental illness operated by the Alabama
Department of Mental Health. Brown was 19 years old at the
time of his commitment and had a long history of mental
illness and psychiatric hospitalizations.
particular problem associated with Brown's mental illness
was his tendency to run away from home. Brown's father
testified that Brown began running away from home in 2003. As
Brown grew older, his impulse to run away became so pervasive
that it was necessary to keep him under 24-hour supervision
and to place alarms on his bedroom door and window to keep
him from running away at night. When Brown did run away, he
would sometimes be gone for days at a time, and when found he
would be malnourished and dehydrated. Brown also exhibited
violent behavior and aggression toward his parents and
others. This behavior also escalated as he grew older. In
November 2011, Brown physically attacked his father. The
incident resulted in Brown's arrest and his involuntary
commitment to Searcy Hospital.
Searcy Hospital Brown was assigned a " treatment
team." Dr. Kozlovski, a licensed physician and
psychiatrist employed by the Alabama Department of Mental
Health, was the head of Brown's treatment team and was
responsible for making the ultimate judgment about whether
Brown met the criteria for discharge from Searcy Hospital.
The treatment team also included a social worker, a licensed
psychologist, a rehabilitation coordinator, and a registered
nurse. A treatment plan was devised for Brown, and he was
prescribed medication and received other mental-health
treatment. During his time at Searcy Hospital, Brown had
incidents of self-injurious behavior but was otherwise fully
compliant with his treatment. On April 5, 2012, the treatment
team reached a consensus that Brown had met the conditions
for discharge. On May 18, 2012, despite reservations
expressed by Brown's family that he would run away from a
group-home facility, Brown was discharged to Safe Haven, a
group home owned and operated by Altapointe Health Systems,
Inc. (" Altapointe" ). Dr. Kozlovski approved the
19, 2012, Brown left Safe Haven without the knowledge of Safe
Haven's staff. On May 23, 2012, Brown's body was
found lying on a road in Mobile. Brown had apparently been
struck and killed by a motorist.
as the court-appointed administrator of Brown's estate,
initiated the underlying wrongful-death action in the Mobile
Circuit Court, naming as defendants Dr. Kozlovski and
Altapointe. The complaint alleged that Dr.
Kozlovski had been negligent and/or wanton in numerous
respects. Shamlin's complaint, as amended, alleged that
" a. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to provide
proper and/or adequate treatment of [Brown's] mental
illness and psychological condition;
" b. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to properly
assess and/or diagnose [Brown's] mental illness and
" c. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to identify
[Brown] as a flight risk;
" d. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to assess and/or
diagnose [Brown's] physical needs and/or requirements;
" e. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to determine
whether [Brown] met the admission requirements of Safe Haven,
a non-secure facility;
" f. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to determine
whether Safe Haven had the capability to monitor and
supervise [Brown] at all times in order to prevent [Brown]
from eloping, fleeing or escaping from Safe Haven;
" g. Negligently and/or wantonly approved and authorized
[Brown's] release or discharge from Searcy Hospital, a
secure facility, to Safe Haven, a non-secure facility; and
" [h]. Negligently and/or wantonly failed to advise,
prescribe or otherwise convey that at the time of or prior to
discharging [Brown] from her care at Searcy Hospital to
Altapointe, [Brown] required 24 hour 'around the
clock' eyes-on supervision for at least the first week of
his placement at Safe Haven Group Home."
also alleged that Dr. Kozlovski negligently and/or wantonly
discharged Brown in violation of the Mobile Probate
Court's commitment order and that she negligently and/or
wantonly failed to conduct a suicide-risk assessment before
September 18, 2014, Dr. Kozlovski filed a motion for a
summary judgment, arguing that the claims against her were
barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Shamlin filed
a response in opposition to Dr. Kozlovski's motion for a
summary judgment, in which he contended that Dr. Kozlovski
had violated certain rules and regulations applicable to
Brown's release and was not, therefore, entitled to rely
on the doctrine of State-agent immunity. On December 12,
2014, the trial court denied Dr. Kozlovski's motion,
without explanation. On December 30, 2014, Dr. Kozlovski
timely filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
" Although the denial of a motion for a summary judgment
is generally not appealable, this Court has held that the
denial of a motion for a summary judgment grounded on a claim
of immunity is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus. Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.2d 1276, 1280
(Ala. 2008). In such case, we apply the following standard of
" '" 'While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable,
... the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded on a
claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of
mandamus.' Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912
(Ala. 2000). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
available only when there is: '(a) a clear legal right to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent
to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack
of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte BOC Group,
Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)." '
" Kennedy, 992 So.2d at 1280 (quoting Ex
parte Nall, 879 So.2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003))."
Ex parte Ruffin, [Ms. 1130324, Aug. 29, 2014] 160
So.3d 750, *5 (Ala. 2014).
Kozlovski contends that the trial court erred in denying her
motion for a summary judgment because, she argues, she is
entitled to State-agent immunity in this case. In response,
Shamlin argues that Dr. Kozlovski is not entitled to
State-agent immunity from the wrongful-death claim because,
he contends, Dr. Kozlovski's actions, as related to
Brown's discharge from Searcy Hospital, violated several
rules and regulations applicable to Dr. Kozlovski. For the
reasons stated below, we agree that Dr. Kozlovski is immune
from the wrongful-death claim asserted by
Brown's estate, and we issue the writ of mandamus.
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a
plurality of this Court restated the test for determining
when a State employee is entitled to immunity as
" A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in
his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis
of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's
" (1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or
" (2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of government,
including, but not limited to, examples such as:
" (a) making administrative adjudications;
" (b) allocating resources;
" (c) negotiating contracts;
" (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or
supervising personnel; or
" (3) discharging duties imposed on a department or
agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the
statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties
in that manner; or
" (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the
criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to
arrest persons;  or
" (5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties
imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing
prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind,
or educating students.
" Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be
immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity
" (1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or
regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the
purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency
require otherwise; or
" (2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the law."
792 So.2d at 405 (second emphasis added). This Court has
developed the following burden-shifting process applicable to
the assertion of a State-agent-immunity defense:
" 'This Court has established a "
burden-shifting" process when a party raises the defense
of State-agent immunity.' Ex parte Estate of
Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a
function that would entitle the State agent to immunity.'
946 So.2d at 452. Should the State agent make such a showing,
the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of
the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity
recognized in Cranman is applicable. The exception being
argued here is that 'the State agent acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her
authority.' 946 So.2d at 452. One of the ways in which a
plaintiff can show
that a State agent acted beyond his or her authority is by
proffering evidence that the State agent failed '"
to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist." '
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d [173,] 178
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala.
case concerns the discharge from a mental hospital of a
patient suffering from mental illness. Our Court has
previously recognized the " complicated"
determinations that must be made by State mental-health
professionals in balancing the " dual duty they owe to
the public and to the individual patient" in making such
discharge decisions. Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770,
784 (Ala. 1988).
" The defendants owe a duty to the general public not to
release a civilly committed patient until his treatment has
been completed and he is no longer a threat to public safety
and order. ... However, the defendants, have a concomitant
duty to the patient, as demonstrated by the minimum
constitutional guidelines of Wyatt [v. Stickney, 344
F.Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972),] and Lynch [v. Baxley,
386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974)]. The defendants must
provide their patient a treatment program that achieves the
purposes of confinement under the least restrictive
conditions. They must provide him with intermediate and
long-range treatment goals; and, if he fulfills those goals
or no longer requires hospitalization in accordance with the
standards for commitment, they must release him. Failure to
do so exposes the defendants to liability for violating the
patient's right to due process of law."
Barnes, 530 So.2d at 784-85. In light of the
opposing duties to the public and the individual patient owed
by State mental-health professionals in determining whether
to discharge a patient, this Court's restatement of
State-agent immunity in Cranman expressly recognized that a
State-agent " exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in ...
counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind" is
entitled to immunity from claims resulting from the exercise
of that judgment. 792 So.2d at 405.
present case, it is not disputed that, in discharging Brown
from Searcy Hospital, Dr. Kozlovski, a psychiatrist employed
by the Alabama Department of Mental Health, was engaging in a
function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity under
category (5) of the Cranman restatement. Accordingly, Dr.
Kozlovski met her burden of demonstrating " that the
plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would
entitle the State agent to immunity." Ex parte
Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
Thus, the burden then shifted to Shamlin to demonstrate that
one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent
immunity applied. Reynolds, 946 So.2d at 452.
end, Shamlin argues that Dr. Kozlovski acted beyond her
authority in discharging Brown from Searcy Hospital to the
Safe Haven group home because, he says, she failed to comply
with certain rules and regulations concerning the discharge
of patients and " after-care" planning. See Ex
parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000);
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003). Shamlin identifies two sets of rules and regulations
governing the discharge of patients from Searcy Hospital:
" Rules and Regulations of the Psychiatry and Medical
Sections of the Organized Medical Staff of Searcy
Hospital" and " Written Plan for Client Care and
Professional Services." Dr. Kozlovski does not dispute
the applicability of these rules and regulations.
Shamlin cites two paragraphs of the " Rules and
Regulations of the Psychiatry and Medical Sections of the
Organized Medical Staff of Searcy Hospital," which
" N. The patient's discharge plan, initiated at
admission, will be revised and updated throughout the
hospital stay. The psychiatrist will participate with the
treatment team in discharge planning, which is based on
achieving treatment goals and geared toward restoring the
patient to sufficiently improved psychiatric functioning to
return to the community. The psychiatrist, along with the
treatment team, will collaborate with the patient's
family, significant others, and community providers to
establish discharge criteria and develop the specific
components of an appropriate aftercare plan.
" O. The psychiatrist will evaluate the patient's
psychiatric condition at the time of discharge. A final
progress note will be entered in the medical record that
addresses the patient's potential for danger to self or
others, including the absence of suicide or homicidal
ideation. A final review of medications will be made and a
2-week supply of medication along with a prescription written
for a 30-day supply of medications will be issued as part of
the aftercare plan, unless clinically contraindicated. The
final psychiatric diagnoses shall be recorded in the medical
next cites Searcy Hospital's " Written Plan for
Client Care and Professional Services," which provides,
" a. Psychiatric Services
" (1) Scope of Service: Psychiatric Services is
responsible for insuring that all clients admitted, evaluated
or treated by any of the clinical services or facilities of
the hospital receive appropriate, quality psychiatric care.
Services provided include, but are not limited to, the
" (a) Coordinate psychiatric service planning with other
staff and provide service team leadership.
" (b) Approve all hospital releases. Participate in
discharge and aftercare planning.
" (c) Evaluate/diagnose/treat/medicate clients in
compliance with hospital standards.
" (d) Provide psychiatric opinion/consultation to other
" (e) Participate in medical staff and hospital
" (f) Complete required documentation, including Axis I
and II of the index of diagnosis, the Initial Treatment Plan,
Psychiatric Evaluation, progress notes, and quarterly
Shamlin cites another section of the " Written Plan for
Client Care and Professional Services" :
" I. Discharge
" It is the policy of Searcy Hospital to discharge
clients when they have met their individual criteria for
discharge and when a less restrictive treatment environment
is deemed therapeutically appropriate. This decision is made
by the treating psychiatrist in coordination with the other
members of the treatment
team, the client, the client's family, and involved
agencies, as appropriate.
" Discharge planning begins when the client enters the
hospital and continues to be a major component of the
treatment plan throughout the client's hospitalization.
At the time of admission, the client, the client's
family, and involved agencies, as appropriate, are consulted,
and their views on discharge planning are recorded in the
social history. The family of the client is informed of
discharge planning as needed and at regularly scheduled
Treatment planning conferences to which the family is
" There are a variety of placement options in addition
to the client returning home, such as group homes, foster
homes, apartments, nursing homes, etc. The discharge plan is
documented on the Post-Hospitalization Plan form at the time
of the initial development of the Treatment plan and it is
reviewed with each Treatment planning update and as needed.
" When the client is nearing discharge, outpatient
follow-up care with the mental health center is arranged as
appropriate. Prior to the client's first appointment, and
many times prior to scheduling a mental health center
appointment, written information is exchanged with the mental
health center via a continuity of care packet. This includes
information regarding the diagnoses, brief treatment and
hospital course to include course of medications, discharge
mental status, recommendations for follow-up and a list of
medications on which the client will be discharged. Discharge
summaries and recommendations for follow-up treatment of the
client are sent to community mental health centers and/or
private medical/psychiatric practitioners following
the deposition testimony of Dr. Kozlovski, in which she
stated that Brown needed 24-hour supervision during his first
week away from Searcy Hospital and at Safe
Haven, Shamlin contends that Dr. Kozlovski
violated duties expressed in the above rules and regulations.
" Dr. Kozlovski failed to inform anyone, verbally or in
writing, that [Brown] required 24-hour eyes on supervision
during the first week following his discharge from Searcy
Hospital to the Safe Haven Group Home. Dr. Kozlovski failed
to develop, much less participate in developing, the specific
components of [Brown]'s aftercare plan. Dr. Kozlovski
failed to cooperate with [Brown]'s family, discharging
[Brown] to a nonsecure residential group home. Dr. Kozlovski
failed to coordinate psychiatric service/planning by
discharging [Brown] to a nonsecure residential group home
knowing that there was a 'high probability' [Brown]
would run away. Dr. Kozlovski
failed to cooperate with other 'community providers'
(i.e., AltaPointe ... and/or the Safe Haven Group Home) in
developing the specific components of an appropriate
aftercare plan for [Brown]."
(Shamlin's brief, at 17-18.) Thus, Shamlin argues that,
in not following the rules and regulations Searcy Hospital
had in place for discharging patients, Dr. Kozlovski acted
beyond her authority in discharging Brown to Safe Haven and
that the trial court's denial Dr. Kozlovski's motion
for a summary judgment grounded on State-agent immunity was
proper. We disagree.
not apparent from the evidence in the materials before us
that Dr. Kozlovski violated any of the rules, regulations, or
policies Shamlin references. The evidence appears to be
undisputed that Brown's treatment team developed a
discharge plan for Brown and that it subsequently determined
that conditions for his discharge had been met. Shamlin
claims Dr. Kozlovski failed to develop a proper "
aftercare plan." None of the materials before us,
however, precisely defines what constitutes an "
aftercare plan." Nevertheless, it appears that Dr.
Kozlovski complied with all the express requirements set
forth in the above-referenced rules and regulations.
Kozlovski completed a " release instructions" form
and a " release/discharge assessment" form for
Brown. In those forms she "
evaluate[d] [Brown's] psychiatric condition at the time
of discharge" and provided a " discharge
diagnosis." The forms noted Brown's medication,
treatment, and " hospital course." Dr. Kozlovski
recommended that Brown was to continue taking his prescribed
medications and to follow up with his primary-care physician
once he was discharged. Further, Dr. Kozlovski signed off on
a " discharge medication list verification" form,
which listed Brown's prescribed medications and provided
instructions for Brown to continue taking the listed
medications. The medical records also indicate that Dr.
Kozlovski entered a progress note that stated that Brown was
not suicidal or homicidal at the time of his discharge.
there any evidence indicating that Dr. Kozlovski failed to
cooperate with Brown's family in discharging Brown to
Safe Haven. Brown's family expressed concern regarding
Brown's discharge to a group home, and the family's
concern was noted in the file. Brown's father testified
that he attended and participated in treatment-team meetings
concerning Brown's discharge. This is not evidence
indicating that Dr. Kozlovski refused to cooperate with the
family or that she ignored the family's concerns. To the
contrary, it appears from the documents before us that
Brown's treatment team recognized and empathized with the
family's concerns but determined that, based on its
evaluation of Brown, he had met the criteria for discharge
from Searcy Hospital. Likewise,
there is no evidence indicating that Dr. Kozlovski failed to
cooperate with " community providers" regarding
Brown's discharge criteria or after-care plan.
sure, this is a difficult case. The concerns of Brown's
family regarding Brown's discharge from Searcy Hospital,
unfortunately, proved justified. But it is nonetheless
undisputed that Dr. Kozlovski, in making a judgment
concerning Brown's discharge, was " discharging
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation ... in
releasing [a person] of unsound mind ...."
Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. We cannot say from the
materials before us that Dr. Kozlovski " failed to
discharge [her] duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."
Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d at 178. Nor can we say
that her decision to approve Brown's discharge was made
" willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond [her] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of
the law ...." Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405.
Accordingly, Shamlin has not met his burden to establish
that, in discharging Brown from Searcy Hospital to Safe
Haven, Dr. Kozlovski acted " beyond ... her
authority." Therefore, Dr. Kozlovski is entitled to
on the materials before us, Dr. Kozlovski is entitled to
State-agent immunity from the wrongful-death action asserted
against her by Shamlin, as administrator of Brown's
estate. Accordingly, she has shown a clear legal right to the
relief sought, and the trial court is directed to enter a
summary judgment in her favor.
GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
The decedent's name is spelled three
ways in the materials before this Court: Jeffery, Jeffrey,
and Jefferey. We have chosen to use the spelling used by the
Brown had been diagnosed as suffering from
numerous conditions and mental illnesses, including
pervasive developmental disorder, oppositional defiant
disorder, bipolar disorder, conduct disorder, Asperger's
syndrome, schizoaffective disorder, adjustment disorder,
psychotic disorder, dysthymia, generalized anxiety disorder,
The progress notes for that date
" Mr. Brown is not suicidal or homicidal, and
it is noteworthy that Mr. Brown has met criteria for
discharge, has been accepted for Group Home Placement and
is waiting for bed space."
Likewise, the progress notes from May 17,
" [Brown] reports desire to be placed in Group
Home setting. [Brown] continues to meet discharge criteria
The incident is characterized in the record
as a " hit-and-run." Shamlin contends that
Brown's death was a suicide.
Altapointe is not a party to this
The complaint does not state whether Dr.
Kozlovski was sued in her official or individual capacity.
Dr. Kozlovski correctly argues that any claims asserted
against her in her official capacity are barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Ala. Const. 1901, §
14; Ex parte Department of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 937 So.2d 1018, 1023 (Ala. 2006); and
Ex parte Department of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 811 (Ala. 2002). Shamlin
does not respond to Dr. Kozlovski's official-capacity
argument, and his arguments before this Court are limited
solely to the issue whether Dr. Kozlovski is entitled to
State-agent immunity. Thus, we assume that his claims against
Dr. Kozlovski are asserted against her in only her individual
Shamlin's response is limited to
assertions that Dr. Kozlovski's actions in discharging
Brown to Safe Haven violated certain rules and regulations
applicable to Dr. Kozlovski. To the extent that his complaint
alleged theories of recovery against Dr. Kozlovski based on
actions not directly related to Brown's discharge from
Searcy Hospital, those claims appear to have been
The test set out in Cranman was
subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court in Ex
parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala. 2000).
Following Cranman, category (4) was further
clarified. See Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.2d
300 (Ala. 2006).
Dr. Kozlovski testified as follows during
" Q: ...[D]id [Brown] need any supervision at
all once he left Searcy?
" A: He needed supervision, yes, sir.
" Q: Did he need round-the-clock
" A: I don't think so. ... At least the
first week, he get to know people there and build some
trust with his new environment.
" Q: So the first week he needed
" A: Yes, sir. I would say since it's a new
environment, he would [need] supervision around the clock,
until he got adjusted.
" Q: And does that mean somebody keeping
their eyes on him around the clock?
" A: Yes, sir."
The information categories on those
preprinted forms generally appear to correspond to the
categories of information required to be provided by the
psychiatrist upon a patient's discharge according to the
" Rules and Regulations of the Psychiatry and Medical
Sections of the Organized Medical Staff of Searcy
Hospital" and the " Written Plan for Client Care
and Professional Services."
For example, Brown's file contained
the following progress note:
" Social Worker contacted client's father,
David Brown, to inquire about recent meeting with
AltaPointe Health System's Transitional Living Home.
Father reports meeting went well and home appears to be
good location with several positive services. Father
reports concerns over client's history of suicidal
behaviors and elopement. Father reports group home does not
appear to have adequate security to prevent elopement.
Social Worker empathized with father's concerns and
informed father that treatment team has evaluated client
[and client] is currently free of any suicidal ideation
and/or behaviors. Client has reported 'good' mood
for several weeks and is able to maintain ground privileges
successfully without any attempts at elopement.
Father reports agreement with treatment team assessment,
however continues to report apprehension regarding
client's release. Father states 'he seems happy in
the hospital and I don't see a need for him to have a
discharge.' Social worker reported that father's
concerns will be further discussed with treatment team and
social worker to follow up with father."
A follow-up progress note stated:
" Social Worker contacted client's father
to provide progress update. Father informed of recent
interview of AltaPointe Health Systems for group home
placement. Client presented well in interview and was
accepted for placement at this time awaiting bed
availability. Father reports understanding and agreement
with client's discharge plans."