United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
OPINION AND ORDER
MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Jane Lewis filed this lawsuit in an Alabama state court asserting state-law claims of negligent, wanton, and fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression against the following two defendants: Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia d/b/a Greater Georgia Life Insurance Company and ESG Operations, Inc. Greater Georgia Life, with the consent of ESG, removed the case to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that Lewis's claims are completely preempted' by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and thus the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The case is currently before the court on Lewis's motion to remand and Greater Georgia Life and ESG's motion to dismiss. The remand motion will be denied, and the dismissal motion will be granted, albeit with leave to restate a claim under ERISA.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1162 (1997). Removal statutes should be construed narrowly, and all doubts about removal should be resolved in favor of remand. Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant may submit affidavits, depositions, or other evidence to support removal. Hardy v. Welch, 135 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1177 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (Thompson, J.).
A lawsuit filed in state court may be removed by a defendant where the district court would have had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A court has original federal-question jurisdiction if a federal issue is apparent on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Under this well-pleaded complaint rule, "a defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction." Id . There is, however, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule in cases where Congress "so completely pre-empt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987); Jones v. LMR Intern., Inc., 457 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2006).
Should the court find Lewis's claim is completely preempted by federal law and, thus, remand inappropriate, the court will also address Greater Georgia Life's motion to dismiss. In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations, " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), but rather "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 574.
This case arises out of Greater Georgia Life's denial of Lewis's life insurance claim following the death of her late husband. ESG, a Georgia-based company, contracts with municipalities to manage their utility and public works operations. ESG employed Lewis for over year. During her employment, Lewis and her husband were covered under a "Basic Group Term Life, Basic Accidental Death & Dismemberment and Optional Group Term Life Insurance" policy issued by Greater Georgia Life. The insurance company issued the policy as part of a group plan with ESG as plan sponsor.
When Lewis decided to leave her employment with ESG, she contacted an ESG human resources employee to discuss her policy with Greater Georgia Life. The human resources employee represented to Lewis that she could take her policy with her and that, by paying the insurance premiums herself, the policies would stay in full force and effect. Lewis then contacted Greater Georgia Life to confirm that she would be allowed to pay her insurance premiums personally and retain coverage. Based on these conversation, Lewis provided the insurance company with her personal mailing address and set up payment arrangements.
Lewis paid the policy's premiums from 2007 through 2012. In December of 2012, her husband had a stroke. Following her husband's hospitalization, Lewis notified Greater Georgia Life of a possible claim for benefits under her policy. The insurance company, in turn, represented to Lewis that the policy was in full force and effect and that all necessary premiums had been paid through February 2013. However, in January 2013, the insurance company contacted Lewis and informed her that her policy had been cancelled and all coverage was terminated.
Lewis's husband died on May 18, 2013, and Lewis made a claim for benefits under her policy. Greater Georgia Life denied Lewis's claim, again informing her that the policy had been cancelled and all coverage terminated. Upon receipt of the insurance company's denial, Lewis filed suit in an Alabama state court, initially asserting breach of contract; later, she amended her complaint to assert negligent, wanton, and fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression on the part of Greater Georgia Life and ESG. The insurance company removed the action to this court on April 30, 2014.
A. Motion to Remand
The resolution of Lewis's motion to remand turns on the timeliness of Greater Georgia Life's notice of removal and the proper characterization of Lewis's life insurance policy. Lewis puts forth three arguments in favor of remand: (1) the insurance policy is not governed by ERISA because it was neither established nor maintained by Lewis's employer or an employee organization on her employer's behalf; (2) the insurance policy is statutorily exempt from ERISA coverage as ESG exists solely to act as a governmental instrumentality performing governmental functions for the City of Opelika; and (3) Greater Georgia Life's notice of removal was not timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. The insurance company disputes Lewis's contentions and maintains that her policy is properly characterized as an employee benefit plan, and, accordingly, Lewis's state-law claims are completely preempted by ERISA and subject to federal jurisdiction.
Congress enacted ERISA to protect "the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). Federal preemption based on ERISA may take one of two forms: defensive' preemption and complete preemption.' Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir. 1999); Whitt v. Sherman Int'l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998). Because Lewis ...