T.N. and C.N.
for Publication April 28, 2016.
from Montgomery Juvenile Court. (JU-10-649.04). Anita L.
Kelly, Trial Judge.
Appellants: Samuel J. McLure of The Adoption Law Firm, LLC,
Appellee: Michael Guy Holton, Wetumpka.
Judge. Thompson, P.J., and Pittman and Moore, JJ., concur.
Thomas, J., recuses herself.
and C.N. petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Montgomery Juvenile Court (" the juvenile
court" ) (1) to refrain from interfering with their
attempts to enforce a judgment entered by the Elmore Probate
Court (" the probate court" ) on May 8, 2014,
granting T.N. and C.N.'s petition to adopt S.B. ("
the child" ), (2) to vacate a judgment in which the
juvenile court granted custody of the child to D.C., and (3)
to cease all proceedings relating to the child.
underlying juvenile court proceedings, in which T.N. and C.N.
were not parties, the juvenile court entered a judgment on
April 21, 2014, granting custody of the child to D.C. and
amended that judgment on May 16, 2014, pursuant to a
postjudgment motion filed by the Montgomery County Department
of Human Resources (" DHR" ). On May 9, 2014, the
guardian ad litem for the child filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order in the juvenile court seeking to
enjoin T.N. and C.N. from taking action to enforce the
judgment entered by the probate court granting T.N. and
C.N.'s petition to adopt the child. On the same day, the
juvenile court entered a temporary restraining order
directing T.N. and C.N., their agents, and law enforcement to
refrain from removing the child from D.C.'s custody. The
juvenile court amended the restraining order on May 12, 2014,
and set the matter for a hearing on May 20, 2014. On May 16,
2014, T.N. and C.N. filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
with this court. On May 20, 2014, the juvenile court entered
an order canceling the hearing scheduled for that day and
indefinitely extending the restraining order. The juvenile
court's order cited T.N. and C.N.'s filing of the
petition for a writ of mandamus as good cause to extend the
injunctive relief granted in the temporary restraining order.
See Rule 65(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (" Every temporary
restraining order ... shall expire by its terms within such
time after entry not to exceed ten (10) days ..., unless
within the time so fixed the order for good cause shown is
extended ...." ). On the same day, T.N. and C.N. amended
their petition with this court asserting that the juvenile
court's May 20 order converted the temporary restraining
order into a preliminary injunction that was entered without
proper notice to T.N. and C.N. and without providing T.N. and
C.N. with a right to be heard. Because the proper method to
challenge an injunction is by direct appeal pursuant to Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., this court has elected to treat the
petition for a writ of mandamus as an appeal. See J.A.W.
v. G.H., 72 So.3d 1254, 1256 (Ala.Civ.App.
2011)(citing Ex parte State Pers. Bd., 45 So.3d 751,
754 (Ala. 2010)(holding that the proper means of obtaining
appellate review in cases in which the trial court has
enjoined the activity of a nonparty is by means of an
appeal)). We dismiss the appeal because the issue regarding
the restraining order is moot and because T.N. and C.N. have
no standing to challenge the custody order.
appeal, T.N. and C.N. contend that the juvenile court lacked
authority to enter the orders restraining them, their agents,
or law enforcement from enforcing the probate court's
judgment of adoption and that the temporary restraining
orders are void because the juvenile court no longer had
jurisdiction over the matter after the probate court granted
their petition to adopt the child. Pursuant to §
26-10A-3, Ala. Code 1975, proceedings for the adoption of a
child brought under the Alabama Adoption Code, §
26-10A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, are within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the probate court. Our supreme court
has stated that " adoption proceedings are outside the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court unless transferred
there." Ex parte A.M.P., 997 So.2d 1008, 1021
(Ala. 2008)(citing § 12-15-30(b)(5), Ala. Code 1975).
" This court has noted that the juvenile court is
'concerned with a different issue than the probate court
and that [their respective judgments] are separate judgments
rendered on different facts under different law.'"
B.C. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., [Ms.
2140100, Jan. 16, 2015] 169 So.3d 1059, , *3 (Ala.Civ.App.
2015)(quoting D.B. v. J.E.H., 984 So.2d 459, 462
(Ala.Civ.App. 2007)). We have also concluded that a juvenile
court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin nonparties from
taking action in a probate court to adopt a child. See
B.C., 169 So.3d at 1061, *3, and J.A.W., 72
So.3d at 1257. We note that the record does not reflect that
T.N. or C.N. were made parties to the juvenile proceedings at
issue in this appeal; however, T.N. nor C.N. do not raise any
issue regarding whether the juvenile court has ...