United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE CAPEL, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
On May 8, 2013, federal inmate Aljawon Dawyane Miles ("Miles") filed this pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. No. 1. Miles challenges his guilty plea conviction and resulting sentence imposed in June 2010 for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). He argues that the district court improperly participated in the plea-negotiation process and that his 48-month sentence violated the terms of the plea agreement. See Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 12. The Government answers that Miles's § 2255 motion should be dismissed as untimely under the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). See Doc. No. 9 at 5-6.
One-year Limitation Period
The timeliness of Miles's § 2255 motion is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), which provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
Miles pled guilty on February 11, 2010, and was sentenced to 48 months in prison on June 3, 2010. The district court entered judgment on June 15, 2010. Miles took no appeal. Under § 2255(f)(1), then, his conviction became final on June 29, 2010, upon expiration of the time for him to file an appeal (i.e., 14 days after entry of judgment by the district court). See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). He therefore had until June 29, 2011, to file a § 2255 motion that was timely under § 2255(f)(1). He did not file his § 2255 motion until May 8, 2013. Consequently, absent statutory or equitable tolling, his § 2555 motion is time-barred.
Miles makes no attempt to argue that the limitation period in his case is governed by any statutory tolling provision in § 2255(f)(2)-(4). However, he suggests he is entitled to equitable tolling because he "lacks knowledge of law, " was incarcerated in state facilities with limited or no law libraries - or was put in segregation - during the initial part of his ...