United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Remand (doc. 5) filed by plaintiffs, Cedar Creek Land & Timber, Inc. and Pruet Production Company. The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
Plaintiffs, Cedar Creek Land & Timber, Inc. ("Cedar Creek") and Pruet Production Co. ("Pruet"), brought this quiet title action against N. Gunter Guy, Jr., as Commissioner of the State of Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources ("Commissioner Guy"), in the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, Alabama, on November 20, 2014. The Complaint alleges that Cedar Creek owns numerous tracts of real property in Conecuh and Covington Counties that abut or lie underneath the beds, bottoms and streams of the Sepulga River, Pigeon Creek and Bottle Creek (collectively, the "Waterways"). The Complaint further alleges that Pruet is engaged in the oil and gas exploration business, pursuant to which it has obtained oil, gas and mineral leases from Cedar Creek and other landowners, including leases for certain lands that lie beneath the beds and bottoms of the Waterways. According to the Complaint, Commissioner Guy has taken the position that the State of Alabama owns the beds and bottoms of the Waterways and has issued an invitation for bids to lease certain of those lands. The Complaint alleges that Commissioner Guy predicates this claim of State ownership on a "contention that said river and creeks are navigable waterways." (Complaint, ¶ 7.)
The Complaint delineates two causes of action. The first claim, which plainly arises under state law, is labeled "Bill to Quiet Title" and seeks judicial determinations that "Cedar Creek is the owner of the lands described in this Complaint;" that "Pruet holds valid leases on the oil, gas and mineral rights lying underneath the streams, beds and bottoms of said river and creek under the land it has leased;" and that Commissioner Guy "has no right, title, claim or interest" in such lands. (Complaint, at 4.)
The second claim is labeled "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, " and alleges that "[a] justiciable controversy exists between the Plaintiffs and Defendant as to the ownership of said oil, gas and mineral" interests underneath the Waterways. ( Id., ¶ 21.) This declaratory judgment claim identifies as a key issue the question of navigability of the Waterways. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that the Waterways "are not navigable waterways and were not navigable waterways when the State of Alabama entered the Union on December 14, 1819;" and accuse the State of promulgating "conflicting and varying views as to whether" the Waterways "are navigable or not." ( Id., ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiffs further assert in their pleading that the State "attempted to legislate that certain portions of the Sepulga River and other rivers and streams were navigable waterways, " and insist that the State was not permitted to do so where the effect would be to "take away property rights secured by the State and Federal Constitution." ( Id., ¶ 17.) The Complaint is silent as to why plaintiffs contend the navigable status vel non of the Waterways matters for purposes of their claim for declaratory judgment; however, the ad damnum clause confirms that the relief plaintiffs seek includes a declaration that the subject Waterways "are not navigable waterways" in the relevant areas. ( Id. at 7.)
On its face, the Complaint did not and could not support diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, inasmuch as plaintiff Cedar Creek and Commissioner Guy both appear to be Alabama citizens. Nor was any federal question or cause of action presented on the face of the Complaint that might give rise to jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Nonetheless, Commissioner Guy filed a Notice of Removal on December 15, 2014, removing this action to federal court and contending that jurisdiction is proper under § 1331 "in that the action arises under the equal footing doctrine of the United States Constitution." (Doc. 1, ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs now move for remand of this action to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction.
A removing defendant must establish the propriety of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and, therefore, must demonstrate the existence of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) ("the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with the defendant seeking removal"); City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fidelity Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012) ("The removing party bears the burden of proof regarding the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction."). This burden applies equally in the context of a motion to remand. See Connecticut State Dental Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009) ("On a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of showing the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction."). Because removal infringes upon state sovereignty and implicates central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, with all jurisdictional doubts being resolved in favor of remand to state court. See, e.g., Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882 ("we strictly construe the right to remove and apply a general presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand") (citation and internal marks omitted).
In his Notice of Removal, Commissioner Guy maintains that jurisdiction is proper under the federal question statute found at 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ( See doc. 1, ¶ 4.) Pursuant to § 1331, federal courts possess "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. "The test ordinarily applied for determining whether a claim arises under federal law is whether a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint." Connecticut State Dental, 591 F.3d at 1343; see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 765 n.20 (11th Cir. 2010) (typically, "a defendant may remove on the basis of federal question jurisdiction only where that question appears on the face of the plaintiff's complaint"). On its face, the Complaint filed by Cedar Creek and Pruet does not assert a federal question, nor do their claims purport to have been created by the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; rather, Count One is a state-law claim to quiet title, and Count Two essentially seeks the same relief via the procedural vehicle of declaratory judgment.
In briefing the Motion to Remand, the parties' analyses are steeped in the vernacular of this traditional "face of the complaint" rule, and its narrow exception for state-law claims that turn on substantial questions of federal law. Defendant insists that a federal question is presented in Count Two (declaratory judgment), while plaintiffs disagree. Although neither side acknowledges as much, the jurisdictional framework and analysis differ in the context of a declaratory judgment claim. Notably, the "face of the complaint" rule is inapplicable to an assessment of whether § 1331 jurisdiction is proper for a declaratory judgment action. See Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Resources, Inc., 542 F.3d 859, 862 (11th Cir. 2008) ("in the context of a declaratory judgment action, the normal position of the parties is reversed; therefore, we do not look to the face of the declaratory judgment complaint in order to determine the presence of a federal question") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the rule is that "[f]ederal question jurisdiction exists in a declaratory judgment action if the plaintiff has alleged facts in a well-pleaded complaint which demonstrate that the defendant could file a coercive action arising under federal law." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court precedent from which the Eleventh Circuit derived the rule applied in Stuart Weitzman was pellucidly clear that it applies both in original jurisdiction and removal actions, and as to both federal declaratory judgment actions and state declaratory judgment actions. See Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 17-19, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).
The upshot is this: "[A] federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action if... a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint alleges facts demonstrating the defendant could file a coercive action arising under federal law." Household Bank v. JFS Group, 320 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003). Careful scrutiny of the Complaint filed by Cedar Creek and Pruet does not reveal factual allegations demonstrating that Commissioner Guy could have filed a coercive action against them arising under federal law. Any coercive action that Commissioner Guy might have brought to cancel Cedar Creek's or Pruet's leases, secure possession of the lands underneath the Waterways, or recover damages from Cedar Creek and Pruet for impairing its purported ownership interests would have been a state-law claim. The parties have cited (and the Court is aware of) no federal statute, regulation or constitutional provision that would have conferred a right of action on the State of Alabama to sue corporate entities within the state over real property ownership and leasing rights; rather, those claims would presumably have sounded in state-law rights of action such as trespass, ejectment, quiet title, conversion or the like. By all appearances, then, any coercive claim that Commissioner Guy might have brought against Cedar Creek and Pruet would have been created by Alabama law, not federal law. Again, the parties have not suggested otherwise. Of course, it was Commissioner Guy's burden (as the removing party) to demonstrate that federal question jurisdiction may properly be invoked here. His failure to identify a federal coercive claim he could have brought against plaintiffs constitutes a glaring deficiency in his efforts to satisfy his burden on the Motion to Remand.
As noted, defendant omitted discussion of this precise issue in briefing the Motion to Remand. Nonetheless, reasonable extrapolation from what he did file suggests that his rejoinder to the foregoing would be that the state-law coercive claims he might have brought against Cedar Creek and Pruet would call for application of the so-called "equal footing doctrine, " which is a creature of federal constitutional law. U.S. Supreme Court precedent dating back at least as far as 1842 has established and defined the equal footing doctrine as follows:
"Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable.... It may allocate and govern those lands according to state law subject only to the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.... The United States retains any title vested in it before statehood to any land beneath waters ...