United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
For Sherry Bridges, Plaintiff: Darryl W Hunt, LEAD ATTORNEY, Marilyn H Macey, CLARK JAMES HANLIN & HUNT LLC, Birmingham, AL.
For Social Security Administration, Commissioner, Defendant: Don B Long, III, LEAD ATTORNEY, United States Attorney's Office - NDAL, Birmingham, AL; Edward Q Ragland, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Birmingham, AL; Kevin Michael Parrington, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, Atlanta, GA.
ABDUL K. KALLON, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Sherry Bridges (" Bridges") brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (" the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (" SSA"). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (" ALJ") applied the correct legal standard and that her decision--which has become the decision of the Commissioner--is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits.
I. Procedural History
Bridges filed her application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on January 31, 2011, alleging an amended disability onset date of January 28, 2011 due to congestive heart failure, sleep apnea, hypertension, and tendonitis. (R. 41, 112, 128, 150). After the SSA denied her application, Bridges requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 61-62, 73). The ALJ subsequently denied Bridges's claim, (R. 19-25), which became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused to grant review, (R. 1-4). Bridges then filed this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), on April 4, 2014. Doc. 1.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial evidence to sustain the ALJ's decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. § § 405(g) and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner's " factual findings are conclusive if supported by 'substantial evidence.'" Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is " reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." See id . (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of evidence; " [i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner's factual findings even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner's findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review of the ALJ's findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review " does not yield automatic affirmance." Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show " the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is " an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the ...