Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Cagle v. Rubley

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

October 20, 2014

JONATHAN CAGLE, Plaintiff,
v.
JILL RUBLEY, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is the motion to dismiss (Doc. 29) filed by Defendants Jill Rubley, Dr. Paul Jungnickel, Jan Kavookjian, and Jessica Starr. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights. The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1, the parties have consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final judgment. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted and that the Plaintiff's claims are due to be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Standard of Review

Although the court must accept well-pled facts as true, the court is not required to accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings, the court must indulge reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, "but we are not required to draw plaintiff's inference." Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, "unwarranted deductions of fact" in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating conclusory allegations are "not entitled to be assumed true").

A complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pled do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S, at 679 (explaining "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-62, 570 (2007) (retiring the prior "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts" standard). In Twombly, the Supreme Court emphasized that a complaint "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint must state a plausible claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 556 U.S. at 570.

II. Facts and Procedural History

On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff Jonathan Cagle filed a complaint (Doc. 1) against Auburn University, Auburn University Harrison School of Pharmacy, Dean R. Lee Evans, Kristen Helms, Dr. Paul Jungnickel, Jan Kavookjian, David Riese, Jill Rubley, and Jessica Starr. Cagle alleged that the Defendants violated Cagle's constitutional rights, breached a contract, and committed various torts in conjunction with student disciplinary proceedings that led to Cagle's expulsion from the Auburn University Harrison School of Pharmacy. (Doc. 1).

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement. (Doc. 13). On April 9, 2014, after being granted an extension of time to respond to the motion, Cagle filed his response. (Doc. 19; Doc. 20). On May 12, 2014, the court held oral argument on the motion to dismiss, and, during this proceeding, the court noted numerous significant pleading deficiencies in the original complaint. ( See Doc. 27). On May 12, 1014, following oral argument, the court dismissed Cagle's claims against Auburn University and Auburn University Harrison School of Pharmacy on grounds of sovereign immunity. (Doc. 26 ¶ 2). The court also dismissed with prejudice Cagle's claims alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. (Doc. 26 ¶ 1). As to Cagle's remaining claims, the court granted the motion for more definite statement and ordered Cagle to file an amended complaint on or before May 26, 2014. (Doc. 26 p. 2).

On May 27, 2014, Cagle filed an amended complaint against Paul Jungnickel, Jan Kavookjian, Jill Rubley, and Jessica Starr, but not against any of the other original Defendants. (Doc. 28). In his amended complaint, Cagle asserts the following claims against the Defendants:

1. that, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by causing various alleged irregularities in the student disciplinary proceedings against Cagle, [1] Defendants Jungnickel, Kavookjian, and Starr violated his constitutional right due process and his alleged constitutional property rights to a pharmacy degree (Doc. 28 ¶¶ 28-33);
2. that, by causing Cagle's expulsion from the pharmacy school, Defendants Jungnickel, Kavookjian, Rubley, and Starr negligently breached a duty to do no harm to Cagle (Doc. 28 ¶¶ 34-36); and
3. that Defendants Jungnickel, Kavookjian, Rubley and Starr intentionally interfered with Cagle's "valid business relationship or business expectancy" in obtaining a pharmacy degree from Auburn University by causing a "breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy." (Doc. 28 ¶¶ 37-39).

On June 10, 2014, Defendants Jungnickel, Kavookjian, Rubley, and Starr filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. After Cagle's attorneys withdrew from the case, Cagle was granted an extension of time to respond to the motion to allow him to obtain an attorney, although he was advised on several occasions that, regardless of whether he is able to retain ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.