United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE CAPEL, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (Doc. 11), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc. 13), and Defendant's Reply (Doc. 16). The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge "for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or recommendations as may be appropriate." Order (Doc. 4). After a review of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and all supporting briefs, and for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) be GRANTED.
The court has carefully considered the pleadings in this case and all documents submitted in support of, and in opposition to, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following relevant facts:
Plaintiff previously worked as a civilian employee at Fort Rucker. See Compl. (Doc. 1) at 1-2. Following a dispute or series of disputes at work,  Plaintiff filed a number of complaints against his supervisor. Id. at 2. At some point, Plaintiff was barred from Fort Rucker. Id. During the complaint process, Plaintiff filed requests, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), for documents relating to the decision to bar him from Fort Rucker. Id. Plaintiff apparently received a "no records" certificate in response to one or more of these FOIA requests. Id.
Plaintiff later filed a separate Title VII case in this court also based on his employment at Fort Rucker. Id. During the pendency of discovery in that case, which also named John McHugh as a defendant, Plaintiff claims that Defendant turned over documents that were responsive to the FOIA request Plaintiff previously made to which he was told no records existed. Id.
On October 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a new Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint alleging that the issuance of the allegedly false "no records" certificate was an act of retaliation for prior protected activity in violation of Title VII. Ex. 1 (Doc. 11-1) at 2-6. On October 30, 2013, the Department of the Army issued a final agency decision dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. Ex. 2 (Doc. 11-2) at 2-9. On November 13, 2013, Plaintiff appealed the final agency decision to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Office of Federal Operations ("EEOC OFO"). Ex. 3 (Doc. 11-3). On December 23, 2013, forty days after filing the appeal and before the EEOC OFO issued a decision on the appeal, Plaintiff filed this this action alleging violation of Title VII. Compl. (Doc. 1) at 1-4. On January 2, 2014, the EEOC OFO sent Plaintiff a letter stating that Plaintiff's appeal "is being closed because you requested withdrawal of the appeal." Ex. 4 (Doc. 11-4) at 2.
Plaintiff requests relief in the form of a "1) A Federal criminal investigation into the aforementioned allegations taken against the Plaintiff by all aforementioned Fort Rucker officials; 2) A de novo Federal Court review of the Plaintiff's bar to Fort Rucker to ensure compliance with the Department of Defense Instruction 5200.08; 3) Three hundred thousand dollars ($300, 000.00) in punitive damage; 4) Fifteen thousand dollars ($15, 000.00) in compensatory damages for out-of-pocket cost resulting in loss of on-post earned retiree benefits; 6) Reimbursement of all back pay and all withdrawn TSP (including withdrawal penalties and interest) since May 2010." Compl. (Doc. 1) at 3-4.
Defendant moves the court to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case." Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, a federal court "should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings" and, "once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Based on the Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendant argues that "Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies." Def.'s Br. (Doc. 11) at 10. Specifically, Defendant argues that "[o]nce an employee files an appeal of the agency final decision, he may file suit in district court only after 180 days have passed from the date of filing the appeal if there has been no final decision, " but, here, Plaintiff filed this judicial action and withdrew his appeal before 180 days passed from the date of appeal. Id. at 11.
In a Title VII action,  a challenge to the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A federal employee must pursue and exhaust h[is] administrative remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII action.")). This court is "obligated to inquire into subject ...