United States District Court, Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division
May 23, 2014
JUSTIN BLAKE SHIREY, #264 423, Plaintiff,
SANDRA GILES, WARDEN, et al ., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TERRY F. MOORER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Bullock Correctional Facility in Union Springs, Alabama, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on May 12, 2014. He alleges that on February 19, 2014, Defendants placed him in the mental health unit at the Bullock Correctional Facility even though he is not mentally ill. This housing assignment, Plaintiff complains, exposes him to unreasonable risks of harm because he is exposed to psychotropic drugs by medical personnel despite the fact he does not take any medication and is asked to take non-prescribed medication. Plaintiff requests issuance of a preliminary injunction directing his removal from the mental health unit of the Bullock Correctional Facility. The court considers Plaintiff's request as a motion for preliminary injunction under Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the court recommends that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief be denied.
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district court . . .” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). The four prerequisites which Plaintiff must demonstrate are: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) that the harm to Plaintiff outweighs the harm to the non-moving parties; and (4) that an injunction would be in the interest of the public. Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1329; Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352 (11thCir. 1983). “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion” as to each of the four prerequisites. See McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule, ” and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless of the party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper”).
Turning to the first prerequisite for issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, the court considers whether Plaintiff has proven a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Having thoroughly reviewed the request for a preliminary injunction and in light of applicable federal law, the court concludes that Plaintiff fails to carry his burden. Specifically, the Constitution itself does not give prisoners an interest in being classified to a particular area within a penal facility. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (“The Constitution does not require that the State have more than one prison for convicted felons; nor does it guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison if, as is likely, the State has more than one correctional institution.”); Clark v. Browers, 2005 WL 1926088, at *3 (E.D.Mo. Aug. 10, 2005) (inmate's motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction that did not seek to enjoin any illegal act of defendants, but instead requested transfer to another correctional facility, denied because “plaintiff does not have a right to be held in the institution of his choosing”). Plaintiff has also not alleged that he will suffer specific and irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued. Additionally, it is impossible to determine what Plaintiff's requested relief would entail exactly preventing the court from determining what burden an injunction would have on the Alabama Department of Corrections and whether issuing one would harm the public interest. The undersigned, therefore, concludes that Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 1) be DENIED.
It is further the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that this case be referred back to the undersigned for additional proceedings.
It is further
ORDERED that on or before June 9, 2014, Plaintiff may file an objection to the Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. Plaintiff is advised this Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable.
Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar a party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.