Appeal from Lee Circuit Court. (CC-94-331). Robert Harper, TRIAL JUDGE.
Rule 39(k) Motion Denied April 14, 1995. Rehearing Denied April 14, 1995. Certiorari Denied June 30, 1995. Released For Publication December 14, 1995.
Taylor, Presiding Judge. All The Judges Concur.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Taylor
The appellant, Rodney Martez Sparks, was charged with attempted murder and was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-20, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.
The state presented evidence that, on June 7, 1993, the appellant shot Tyler Davis in the abdomen in the parking lot of the Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity house in Auburn, Alabama. Davis's injuries necessitated two surgeries and the removal of a portion of his large intestine.
The appellant first contends that the court erred in receiving his out-of-court statements and confession into evidence. Specifically, he contends that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his "constitutional rights."
"The general rule is that '"extrajudicial confessions are prima facie involuntary and inadmissible, and the burden is on the State to prove that the confession was made voluntarily."' Ex parte Weeks, 531 So. 2d 643, 644 (Ala. 1988), quoting Ex parte Callahan, 471 So. 2d 463, 464 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019, 106 S. Ct. 567, 88 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1985). 'The trial court need only be convinced from a preponderance of the evidence to find a confession to have been voluntarily made.' Jackson v. State, 562 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). See also Ex parte McCary, 528 So. 2d 1133 (Ala. 1988)."
Johnson v. State, 611 So. 2d 506, 509 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992).
The state presented evidence that the appellant was informed of his Miranda *fn1 rights and of his rights under Rule 11(A), Ala.R.Juv.P. The appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he had been informed of these rights, that he understood these rights, and that he had read and had signed a form in which he waived these rights.
Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, we conclude that the court did not err in finding that the appellant's statement was knowingly and voluntarily given.
The appellant also contends that the court erred in refusing to provide the jury with a written definition of the offense of assault in the second degree. The court orally instructed the jury on the offense of attempted murder and on the lesser included offenses of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree. During deliberations, the jury requested written definitions of attempted murder and assault in the first degree. At that time, the appellant requested that the jury also be provided with a written definition of assault ...