S. Ct. 785, 57 L. Ed. 1517).' (Emphasis added.)
As observed above, the right of the public to be protected from evils of conduct, even though the constitutional rights of certain persons or groups are thereby in some manner infringed, has received frequent and consistent recognition by the courts of the United States. As the Supreme Court said in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra:
'* * * We have noted that the blaring sound truck invades the privacy of the home and may drown out others who wish to be heard. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513) (1949). The unauthorized parade through city streets by a religious or political group disrupts traffic and may prevent the discharge of the most essential obligations of local government. Cox v. (State of) New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049) (1941). The exercise of particular First Amendment rights may fly in the face of the public interest in the health of children, Prince v. (Commonwealth of) Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645) (1944), or of the whole community, Jacobson v. (Commonwealth of) Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643) (1905), and it may be offensive to the moral standards of the community, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (25 L. Ed. 244) (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (10 S. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637) (1890).'
This is not a restraining order enjoining individuals or groups who are traveling in interstate commerce through Alabama and through this district on bona fide trips. It is only directed to and against those organizations and individuals specifically named, or other like organizations or individuals acting in concert with them or acting as their agents or attorneys, that have been and are engaged in assisting, encouraging, financing and sponsoring groups and/or individuals in traveling in interstate commerce for the specific and announced purpose of testing and demonstrating. Such action has caused and is causing an undue burden and restraint on interstate commerce, resulting here in this State in the past few weeks in disrupting schedules of interstate carriers and causing bona fide interstate passengers to be subjected to violence, threats, intimidation and general inconvenience. While it is true that this violence is caused directly by the Klan groups and others acting in concert with them, and has been allowed by the willful failure of the police authorities to take the usual adequate, protective measures, it is equally true that the Congress of Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Ralph D. Abernathy, F. L. Shuttlesworth, Martin Luther King, Jr., and others acting in concert with them, by their actions in financing and sponsoring and aiding and assisting such nonbona fide trips are directly causing an undue burden and restraint upon interstate commerce within the State of Alabama and within this district.
This Court recognizes that the threat of mob violence is no excuse for the failure of the Court to issue an injunction to protect the constitutional rights of private citizens. Cooper v. Aaron, 1958, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5. However, that principle is not applicable in this case, since here the Court is issuing the injunction prayed for by the United States; however, as the Court has already observed, the granting of the injunction sought by the United States will only partly relieve the burden and restraint on interstate commerce within the State and this district.
The Cooper v. Aaron case is also not applicable here, since in that case the district court, in following Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083, had issued direct orders that certain students be admitted to attend a designated school. In that case the mob violence was directly traceable to State action on the part of State officials in resistance to the Brown decision. In this district, this Court has already been called upon to decide some of the very constitutional rights these individuals traveling in interstate commerce seek to enjoy. Since a class suit has recently been filed asking this Court to determine plaintiffs'
constitutional rights in this respect, continued testing of these laws or customs during the time this suit is pending in this Court can only serve to frustrate this pending litigation. This Court also recognizes the principle announced by the district court in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, D.C. 1960, 188 F.Supp. 916. The constitutional right in that case, as observed by the Court, had been granted by Brown v. Board of Education more than six years before the Court was faced with the situation that local conditions made compliance difficult. In this case, the constitutional right plaintiffs seek to invoke was only made definite by court decision last fall in Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 81 S. Ct. 182, 5 L. Ed. 2d 206. It has not yet been determined whether the local bus terminals fall within that classification that existed in the Boynton case.
In accordance with the foregoing, the preliminary injunction prayed for by the United States is due to be granted against U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., a corporation; Alabama Knights, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., a corporation; Alvin Horn; Robert M Shelton; Thurman E. Ouzts; Claude V. Henley; Lester B. Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery; and Goodwin J. Ruppenthal, Chief of Police of Montgomery, their officers, agents, employees, members, and all persons acting in concert with them.
In accordance with the foregoing, a temporary restraining order, as authorized and provided by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and as prayed for by part of the defendants in this action, is due to be issued to prevent immediate and irreparable injury to the free flow of interstate commerce within this State and within this district, against the following: Congress of Racial Equality, Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Ralph D. Abernathy, individually and as an officer in the Congress of Racial Equality and as an officer in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; the Montgomery City Jail Council and Ralph D. Abernathy as an officer and member of said council; the Student Nashville Non-Violent Movement; Martin Luther King, Jr., individually and as the president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Wyatt Tee Walker individually and as the executive director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, F. L. Shuttlesworth and Solomon S. Seay, Sr., individually and as officers in one or more of the above-named organizations, and all others acting as their agents, officers, or members in or employees of, or acting in concert with them.
This Court is of the further conclusion and it is ORDERED that this cause be and the same is hereby amended to include as defendants each of the above-named individuals and organizations against whom the temporary restraining order is being issued.
This Court is of the further conclusion and it is ORDERED that the Honorable Hartwell Davis, United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama, and such other representative or representatives of the United States Department of Justice as may be designated by the Attorney General for the United States, be and each is hereby designated and appointed to present the evidence as amicus curiae at the hearing for a preliminary injunction, said hearing to be for the purpose of determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue, pending a trial on the merits against each of the individuals and organizations against whom this restraining order is being issued.
The United States Marshal for this district is ordered and directed to serve a copy of these findings, conclusions and order and a copy of the formal preliminary injunction and a copy of the formal temporary restraining order upon each of the defendants in this action against whom the preliminary injunction is being issued and upon each of the defendants against whom the temporary restraining order is being issued.